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IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISffRI T OF THE 




IDAHO DEP AR1MENT OF FISH AND 













MOTION FOR RiEco 
OF A PORTION PF 
JUDGMENT MEMO ... """"'.,,.,.. 
I 
ORDER AND JU,DG 
i 
i 
[Oral Argument ~eque ted] 
I 
I 
I. INTRODUCTION i 
I 
I 
Defendants (hereinafter .. IDFG") respectfully disagree with the Court's ysis upon which . I 
it based its decision to award attorney fees and costs to Plaintiff from ~arr. 31~ 2014, to the 
I 
i 
present. These sanctions were assessed against IDFG because the Court heid 
I 
I . 
a particular dispositive motion prior to the cut-off date in the initial scheduling o der. IDFG submits 
I 
I 
I . . 
that this is not the case. IDFG filed two separate dispositive motions priori to th January .31, 2014, 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF AU'l'HOrun::ES IN 
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schedule order deadline-both of which were granted. The granting ofthes, mo · ns was clispositi ve 
i . 
of the entire case and the complaint was accordingly dismissed by the Co;urt o July 7, 2014. 
i 




This case was origin.ally filed on August 30, 2012. The initial scheij.ulin order provided for 
I 
I 
the filing of dispositive motions by January '.l 1, 2014. Defendaut. complied ~th t t schedulmg order 
I 
I 
by filing two summary judgment motions) the first of which addressed th~ cl · of Eryrin Peralta.; 
! 
and the second based upon IDFG' s position that the remaining Piaintiff c;~uld ot demonstrate the 












claims of Brynn Peralta. She did not appeal this order. On January 31, 20J4, 
I 
I 
summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of Mr. Krinitt's remainingjcla' s. The Court heard 
i 
argument on this motion on May 30, 2014, and entered an order grantinlg 
! 
ary judgment on 
July 7, 2014. This ruling was dispositive of the remainder of the case. Op. Jul . 7, 2014, the Court 
. I 
entered a judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice and vacating the · al date, which had 
I 




Mr. Krinitt appealed the dismissal. Oral argument took place before/the I 
I 
on August 28, 2015. On October 2, 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court ~ssu 
i 
I 




o Supreme Court 
proceedings. At the time the case was remanded, there was no longer a s~hed ing order in place. 
! 
The trial court conducted a scheduling conferenc~ with counsel on Nofem r 19, 2015, during 
I 
which the Court strongly encouraged the parties to consider mediation. After 
I 
! 
issued two orders dated November 24, 2015, requiring the parties to medi~te th matter and setting 
DEFENDANTS' :MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES IN 
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a new trial date of October 17, 2016. During this scheduling conference, th~ p 
i 




on the second summary judgment motion. See Affidavit of Peter J. Joht,tson. 
. I 
counsel to prepare a new scheduling order. Counsel again agreed to defer $is 
! 
time to scheduling and conducting a mediation. See Affidavit of Peter J. Jo 
. I 




es' counsel advised 
ruling by the Court 
he Court left it to 
e parties could not 
agree on the selection of a mediator. Mr. Krinitt insisted on one of four C . ornia lawyers or a 
I 
I 
Montana lawyer. Pursuant to the Court's order to mediate, the parties su~mitt d a list of proposed 
I : 
i 
mediators from which the Court intended to select a mediator. On Janllfil'Y 3, 2016, the Court 
i 
conducted a teleconference with counsel to select a mediator from th~ p · es' proposed lists. 
I 
I 
Shortly prior to that confe:ren.ce, the Court and IDFG were advised that Pllf:suan to a doctor's order~ 
! 
:Mr. Krinitt could not travel to the Northwest for the mediation due to he~th i sues. See Affidavit 
i 
i 
of Peter J. Johnson. I 
I 
The Court struck a compromise by requiring Mr. Krinittto submit abedi letter confimring 
I 
. i 
bis inabpity to travel to the Northwest, by selecting a retired Idaho judge }¥ho 
i 
to California for the mediation. and pennitting IDFG to decide if it w~uld till participate in a 
i 
mediation in. Southern California. See Affidavit of Peter J. Johnson. The ~o made it clear that it 
I 
I . 
would not compel IDFG to mediate in California and indicated that it wopld r quire Mr~ Krinitt to 
; 
pay certain expenses of the mediator to travel to California. See Affid~vit 
Notwithstanding that a representative of the Idaho Risk Management jDep ent and defense 
. I 
I 
counsel would have to travel to California, IDFG agreed to participate in good aith in mediation in 
I . 
i 
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I 
unsuccessful. To date, Mr. Krinitt has never submitted the medical evide~~· S, e Affidavit of Peter 
J. Johnson. 
IDFG then filed a motion seeking dismissal on the basis of statutoJ em oyer immunity. As 
thoroughly discussed and analyzed by the Court, the Idaho Supreme 4ourt ermits a statutory 
i 





adequate time to respond, which in this case it d.id. Although the Court properly anted this motion, 
I 
! 
it assessed fees and costs from January 31, 2014, based upon its analysis thrt ID G had not filed this 
! 




respectfully submits that the Court's application ofl.R.C.P. 16(i) is inapprop 
II. ARGUMENT ! 
There are no cases that have addressed this particular situation. Thelawar ing of attorney fees 
! 
in Idaho is dependent upon a statute or rule of the court permitting the awardin 
I 
i 
Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Com'n, 102 Idaho 744, 639 P.2f 44 (1981); .Hellar v. 
Cenarrusa. 106 Idaho 571> 682 P.2d 524 (1984). The Court ruled that Sfinctio were appropriate 
! 
I 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(i) because there was a faiJure by IDFG to comply ¥th e initial scheduling 
order, although the failure was not intentional. However, IDFG in goo~ fai 
motions which it felt were dispositive of the merits of the case-both of Jhich re granted. IDFG 
i 
i 
acknowledges that it did not consider a dispositive motion based on the st$tory mployerimmunity 
i 
at that time through an oversight. I 
l 




statutory employer immunity defense which could serve as a basis for 1.1}-C.P 16(i) sanctions: 
I 
[T]his Court has held that an affinnative defense may be raised ftjr the 1rst time on 
a motion for summary judgment. ... Though we noted an affirmati~e de ense cannot 
i 
i 
I J SON LAW: GROUP 
I 103 6. Indilllla. Suite A 
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be raised for the first time on appeal, we held "that where the defens was raised 
before trial and the defendant was given time to present argument jn op osition, the 
defense ... can be raised for the first time in the summary judgme~t mo on." Id. · · 
i 
I 
... Thus, the Bluestone requirement that "the defendant was given . to present 
argument in opposition" was met. Appellants were alerted to the~ "ty defense 
by the Memorandum accompanying the State's Motion for Summ!ll)' J dgment and 
had time to respond and present their opposing argument. I 
i 
Therefore, we hold srunmary judgment was proper and that the siate d d not waive 
its affirmative defense of immunity. j · 
Fuhriman v. State, Dep't ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800, 803-04, 153 P.3d 480 (2 07). 
! 
PAGE 09/14 
In addition, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure pennit any PartY to ove for summary 
! 
judgment on all or part of a claim: 
i 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule56(b). Swnmnry Judgm~n~ -Fo Def ending 
Party. I · 
I 
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross~claim! is 
declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or w.;_tho supporting 
affidavits for a summacy judgment in that party's favor as to all ot any art thereof. 
Ptovided, a motion for summacy judgment must be filed at least 9,0 da: s before the 
trial date, or filed within 7 days from the date of the order setting the e for trial, 
whichever is later, unless otherwise ordered by the court. I 
1 
I.R.C.P. 56(b). 
After mediation failed, IDFG properly submitted its motion for s~ judgme~t as to the 
I 
I 
statutory immunity issue approximately seven months before the new tri~ da 
I 
IIL CONCLUSION I 
i 
As the Court and Plaintiffs counsel recognized, there was no int91-tion or bad faith intent 
I 
on the part of IDFG. IDFG does not take issue with the Court's analysis oflits di cretion with respect I . 
I 
to the application ofI.R.C.P. l 6(i). However, IDFG respectfully submits \that i application to this 
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resulted in the vacating of any pretrial scheduling orders. Subsequently., the ~up:z; e Court disagreed 
i 
with the dismissal of Mr. Krinitt' s claims and remanded the case for further pro eedings. Even after 
I . 
I 
IDFG recognized that a dismissal might also be obtained under the statutoty e loyer immunity, it 
I 
voluntarily attempted in good faith to resolve the case through mekatio . When . this was 
I 
I 
unsuccessful, it sought the present relief. I 
! 
IDFG understands the Plaintiffs counsel will be submitting a re~uest for fees and costs, 
i 
which will likely be filed contemporaneously with IDFG' s motion to modify the 
I 
· smissal order and 
d costs request in 
i 
judgment. IDFG respectfully request the opportunity to address Plaintiff, fees 
a subsequent pleading. 
DATED: June 13, 2016. 
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No. CV 12-146 
VEIUFIED MEMORANDUM 
OF COSTS & A TI"ORNEYS FEES 
---------~-) 
State of Montann ) 
)ss 
County of Missoula ) 
Charles H. Carpenter, being duly sworn on his oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am the attorney for the Plaintiff in this action, and submit this 
memorandum of cost.~ and attorney's fees pursuant to the Coures order 
of June 1, 2016. 
00 88 
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2. As noted in that Order, Plaintiff incutted considerable expenses and 
attomets fees in this action between January 31, 2014 and June 1, 2016. 
Attached hereto is a summary of time and costs incurred between those 
dates. 
3. Attorney's fees in the summary are calculated at standard hourly rates: 
$280.00 for Charles Carpenter, $400 for John Sullivan. I have been lend 
counsel throughout the case. Mr. Sullivan assisted the dient in 
ptcparati011 for, and during, the recent mediation. l hnvc been practicing 
law since 1991. Mr. Sullivan practices in Orange County, California, and 
has been practicing since 1975. He has very extensive experie11ce in 
media.ting personal injury cases. 
4. Plaintiff employed three experts during the time peii.od covered by this 
memorandum. Douglas Stimpson of Accident Investigation & 
Reconstruction, is Plaintiffs principle expert on liability issues. Larry 
Grandy, of Air Methods Corporation, serves a.s Plainriffs rebuttal expert 
011 liability. Bath have extensive experience, and thttlr <.1ua.lifications are 
in the record of the case. In addition, throughout the case, Plaintiff has 
employed a non-testifying cxpet:t, Richard McPherson of DownRange 
Global Solutions, to advise him and counsel on technical issues. His 
time in this memorandum refates exclusively to his work in connection 
with the 2014 Motiott for Summary Judgment, and the expert 
depositions taken in March 2014. Fees for all three experts are based on 
their standard rates. 
5. With respect to costs, the State of Idaho has already paid costs as 
ordered by the Idaho Supreme Court, of $1273.65. This amount should 
be deducted from the award given at this stage. 
6. As seen in the summary, fees and costs break down as follows: 
Attomey's Fees 
John Sullivan: $3,400.00 
Charles Carpenter: $55,174.20 
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7. My paralegal Amber Lamb and I have both spent 5ubstantially more 
time on the matter than is shown on the summa.ry attached. In addition 
to the costs listed above ~ which ate passed through the client- I incurred 
consi<lei:ahle costs for automated legal research. Because it is not my 
practice to bill clients for such costs, I have not included them here. I 
tcgarcl such costs as a part of my standatd hourly rate. 
DATED this 141h day of June, 2016. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
before me this /'1-4·"'1 day of June> 2016 
~0,(~ 
NOTARY PUBJ JC 
FAANKR 
NOTARY PUBLIC for the 
State of Montana 
Residing at Mts:ioula, MT 
My Commission Expires 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on the 141h day of June, 2016, I served the foregoing by mailing, 
by fax and by email to: 
Peter J . .J ohmion 
JOHNSON LAW GROUP 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
4 
00 91 
Jun.14.2016 03:10 Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter 4067217364 
Charles H. Carpenter 
210 N. Higgins Avenue 
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Missoula, MT 59802 
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4/10/2014 A. Lamb-Assembled exhibits to opposition 
4/11/2014 Finalized, filed opposition bri8f 
A. Lamb- Finalized opposition brief 
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6/16/2014 Conference with P. Johnson and T. Rabun re: mediation 
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9/5/2014 Reviewed revised final judgment 
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12/8/2014 Finalized, filed brief; draft, flied motion to argument 
A. Lamb Finalized brief 
12/11/2014 Reviewed email from P. Johnson re: extnsion; conference with P. Krlnitt 
'12/16/2014 RttviHwtit.l order on extension 
1/29/2015 Conference with P. Johnson re: augmenting record; extending time for reply 
2/2/2015 Reviewed motion to augment; attachments 
2/4/2015 Conference with P. Johnson re: errors in brief; revised F&G brief, cases cited 
2/6/2015 Draft motion to extend time 
2/9/2015 Finalized motion to extend time 
2/13/2015 Reviewed order and motion to extend time 
2/27/2015 Research re: reply brief 
2/28/201 s Research re: reply brlet. reviewed record 
3/4/2015 Draft reply brief; revised record 
3/5/2015 Draft reply brief 
oo 9a 
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3/6/2015 Revised draft reply brief 
3/8/2015 Revised draft brief 
3/9/2015 Revised brief; email exchange with P. Johnson re: omitted a>chlbit 
3/10/2015 Conference with N. Kinzer re: exhibits; conference with A. Lamb re: motion 
A. Lamb- Draft motion to add documents to record 
3/11/2015 A. Lamb- Flied motion to argument; filed reply brief 
3/20/201 G Reviewed order on record 
3/23/2015 Reviewed order on retention 
4/30/2015 Reviewed order retaining case; conference with P. Krinitt 
5/13/2015 Reviewed notice re: hearing date; email exchange with P. Johnson regarding 
schedule 
5/14/2016 Responded to hearing notice 
6/9/2015 Reviewed order setting case; responded to order; reviewed amended order; 
responded to amended order 
6/15/2015 Conference with c. Schoeggl, P. Krlnltt regarding storage of evidence 
8/17/2015 Conference with K. Lehnnan at Supreme Court re: filing 
8/26/2015 Reviewed briefs and cases cited In briefs in preparation for oral argument 
8/27/2015 Travel to Moscow; prepare for oral argument 
8/28/2015 Oral argument; conference with P. Johnson re: settlement; conference with P. 
Krinitt re: hearing, settlement; travel 
0 0 .~ Ci 0 
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9/24/2015 Reviewed notice of decision 
9/25/2015 Reviewed decision; conference with P. Krinitt 
10/2/2015 Draft memo to P. Krlnitt re: settlement strategy: legal issues 
10/8/2015 Research re: memorandum of costs 
10/9/2015 Finalized, flied memorandum of costs 
A. Lamb research re: memorandum of costs 
10/'16/20'15 A. Lamb prepared lirnt:1111.lt:11.l 1111::1111u1c1ndum of cost& 
10/19/2015 A. Lamb Conference with S. Velasquez at Supreme Court re: costs; conference 
with C. Carpenter re: corrected memo 
11/4/2015 Conference withs. Nutsch re: potential mediators; memo to P. Krinitt re: 
potenttal mediators 
11/9/2015 Revised scheduling order 
11/16/2015 Email exchange with P. Johnson re: mediation 
11/17/2015 Email exchange with P. Johnson re: mediation 
11/19/2015 Scheduling conference with Judge Fitzmaurice; conference with P. Krinitt 
11/20/2015 Reviewed form scheduling order 
12/15/2015 Reviewed Johnson letter re: mediators 
12/22/201ij A. Lamb gathered information re: mediators 
12/23/2015 Draft letter to Judge Fitzmaurice re: mediators 
0010) 
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Page 11 
H[§/R§!ll AmQll.lJ.t 
12/30/2015 email exchange with N. Kinzer, P. Johnson re: schedule 0.10 28.00 
280.00/hr 
1/13/2016 Conference with Judge Fitzmaurice: call with P. Krinitt 0.80 224.00 
280.00/hr 
1/14/2016 Conference with P. Johnson re: mediation, venue 0.50 140.00 
280.00/hr 
1/15/2016 Conference with P. Johnson re: mediation 0.30 84.00 
280.00/hr 
1/21/2016 Conference with P. Krlnltt re: legal Issues, strategy 0.80 224.00 
280.00/hr 
1122/2016 Conference with P. Krinltt re: legal issues, strategy 0.70 
280.00/hr 
196.00 
1/26/2018 email exchange with P. Johnson re: arrangements for mediation 0.20 56.00 
280.001hr 
1/28/2016 email exchange with P. Johnson re: mediation arrangements 0.20 56.00 
280.00/hr 
1/31/2016 Memo to P. Krinitt re: mediation, strategy 0.80 224.00 
280.001hr 
2/3/2016 Email conference with Judge Reinhardt 0.20 56.00 
280.00/hr 
2/11/2016 Conference with P. Krinitt, reviewed faxes re: mediation strategy 1.10 308.00 
280.00/hr 
2/12/2016 Conference with A. Lamb re: travel arrangements 0.20 56.00 
280.001hr 
2/19/2016 Draft mediation statement 1.70 476.00 
280.00/hr 
2/25/2016 Conference with P. Krlnltt re: Mediation statement 0.80 224.00 
280.00/hr 
2/26/2016 Finalized draft mediation statement 1,10 
280.00/hr 
308.00 
2/29/2016 Reinhardt - Reviewed statements 1.35 270.00 
200.00/hr 
3/1/2016 Reinhardt-- Reviewed statements 1.00 200.00 
200.00/hr 
Jun.14.2016 03:14 Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter 4067217364 
3/1/2016 John Sullivan: Conference with client re: strategy; reviewed documents 
3/2/2018 Travel to mediation; mediation, conference with counsel; counsel with P. Krinitt 
in advance and after mediation 
Mediation Session 
Travel to Mediation 
Travel to Boise 
John Sullivan: Mediation, client conference; travel to and from mediation site. 
3/3/2016 Travel from mediation; research re: immunity 
3/8/2016 Preparation for mediation 
3/10/2016 Research re: immunity defense 
3/12/2016 Research re: waiver, immunity, revised record 
3/14/2016 Draft memo on immunity, waiver 
3/19/2016 Reviewed motion for summary judgment 
Draft brief 111 opposition 
4/1/2016 Revised draft brief 
4/12/2016 Revised draft opposition brief 
4/13/2016 Finalized; filed opposition brief 
4/25/2016 Revised reply brief, cases oited therein 
00103 
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4/29/201G Reviewed reply brief 
5/1/2016 Travel, hearing preparation 
5/2/2016 Hearing, conference with P. Johnson re; settlement; travel 
For professional services rendered 
Additional Charges : 
12/8/2013 Service 
Coples 
3/3/2014 Accident Investigation and Reconstruction, Inc.- Copying cost 
3/7/2014 Copies 
Flights and lodging in Denver 
Ground Transportation 
Aooidtml Investigation and Reconstruction, Inc.-- FedEx 
3/9/2014 Richard McPherson-Airfare Lodging, Per Diem. Expenses. Ground Transportation 
3/10/2014 Coples 
3/11/2014 Deposition Transcripts 
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3/2/2016 Airfare- Carpenter 
Airfarew Reinhardt 
Hotel Carpenter and Reinhardt 
Ground Travel 
Meal Mediation 
Travel to Mediation 
5/1/2016 Lodging, dinner 
Travel Expense 
5/2/2016 Travel Expense 
6/10/2016 Appeal Fee 
6/14/2016 Transcript Cost 
Helicopter Storage (Oue In July 2010) 
Copy CD of transmission 
Total additional charges 
Total amount of this bill 
Balance due 
00105 
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6/14/2016 Charles H. Carpenter 
3:51 PM Totals Only Worksheet Page 1 
Billable: Un billable: Interest Payments Prior bal 
Client Fees Fees Fin charge Credits New charges 
Last bill Costs Costs Tax fees Wrt offs NewNR 
Last charge Hours l:!ours Tax costs Refunds Ne~bal 
Krinitt (Bill Of Cost) 
82600.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6/14/2016 10614.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 93214.82 
481 330.70 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 
0.00 0.00 93214.62 
Grand Total 82600.64 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10614.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 93214.82 
330.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 93214.82 
OulClB 
~IIL~IL~ll lb:~l 51::l9325751::l3 
PE'IER J. JOHNSON, ISB # 4105 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Phone: (509) 835-5000 
Fax: (509)326-7503 

















IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TijE'SECOND JUDICIAL JI$TR1 OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 91f LE S 
I . 
. i I PERRYlCRJNrIT, I l 
V. Plaintiff, NO. CV 12-146 11 
IDAHODEPARTMENTOFflSHAND 
GAME and STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' ¥IDTIO TO 
DISALLOW A PQRfI'IO OF 
PLAINTIFF'S COSTS ATTORNEY 
FEES I I 
[Oral Argument R~quest 
I I . I I , 
Defendants (hereinafter "IDFG"), by and through their auomet t rec rd, Peter J. Jolm on 
of Johnson Law Group, respectfully move the Court to disallow a poion of Plaintiffs costs rd 
! I 
attorney fees. This motion is based upon the memorandum of authorities! and t e file and pleadings 
· I I I 
herein. •. J I I 
/ · l ! I 
June 20, 2016. 1 1 I 
JOHNSON LAW G~qUP 





DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISALLOW cosrs -l !t(S 








SON LAW GROUP 
103 a lndwia, Suite A I 
pokane. WA 99207-23117 













CERTIFICATE OF SERYJC~ I I 
PAGE 05/12 
I hereby certify that on this 20 day of June, 2016, I caused to be sehikJ a py of the forego ng 
by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 11 
Charles H. Carpenter [ ] U.S. Mail I J 
Carpenter Law Finn, PLC [ ] Hand Delivery ,
1 
I 
210 N. Higgins Avenue, Suite 336 f;4.Facsimile j 
Missoula, MT 59802 1 ] Federal Expres~ I 
Phone: ( 406) 543-0511 i i 
Fax: (406) 258-0365 11 
IX;\17(3()\Ttial C'.ourt\PIJg\M()T - Di$~llow C'.o~t~ (ZO I (1-(l(i• 17),wp,J 
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103 E. Indiana, Suite A 1 
pokane, WA 99207-131!' 








::lt:J':!.:!Lb ( !:ll::J.:j 
PETERJ. JOHNSON, ISB #4105 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Phone: (509) 835-5000 
Fax: (509) 326-7503 






Le is county Distri t Court 
11 "YILED ;1 


















IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL :qI~TRI T OF TIIB 




IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND 







NO. CV 12-14r 
i ' 
DEFENDANUS" :tv.IE ORANDUM 
SUPPORT 0~ ~on N TO 
DISALLOW ~T OF 
PLA1NTIFF'S ~UB D COSTS 
AND AITORf'fYS ES . 
I I 
[Oral Argume~t f equ sted] 
I ! 
Defendants (hereinafter "IDFG") reopectfully move this Court )o la1 w certain costs nd 
I I I 
attorney fees submitted by Plaintiff. ! t 
I I 
l.R.C.P. 16(!) pem,its the Court to assess reasonable expenses J +lud attorney fees un er 
the cucum,tance, enumerated therein and con,istent with Idaho 1.wj r its decision. the I 
required Plaintiff to file a memorandum of costs and attorney fees pr' uant to I.R.C.P. 54. fe 
Court indicated it would then consider all expenses and fees incurred ~y plain 'ff after January ~l, 
DEFENDANTS' MEM:ORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES - 1 
0010J 
. I 
I I I I 
i J SON LAW GROpP 
I I 03 B, Indiana, Suite A I 
j pokanc, 1"A. 99207-23lf I'm!.: (5 } 835-5000 PAX: (509/ 326-7503 
i I i ! i 
I , 1 













I.R.C.P. 54(a)(l) provides that a court may award reasonable at~opiey ees to the prevailing . 
party. The Plaintiff is not the prevailing party in this matter. Non~eless whether the cL 
proceeds under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) or I.R.C.P. 16(1), the guideline must Uthe asonableness off he 
! I 
fees and expenses. Although IDFG respectfully submits that the Court' k decisi n awarding fees nd 
! I 
costs since January 31, 2014, is not appropriate for the reasons ttline in the motion or 
reconsideration, IDFG submits that the fees and costs requested by Plrttiff re not reasonabl or 
appropriate and therefore objects to certain of the fees and costs conW:ned i Plaintiff's ''verif ed 
I I memorandum of costs and attorney fees." I , 
It is !DFG' s belief that Plaintiff's counseli, on a contingent ft tsi,. While this fact d "' 
not preclude an assessment of reasonable fees under Idaho law, the asrlsme t should not prov de 
I 
Plaintiff with a windfall when he is not the preventing party. That dayI, G will address he 
I , 
requests similar to the categories outlined in Plaintiffs memorandum. ! I 
j 
A Attorney Fees 
I 
1. John Sullivan i ! I 
The plaintiff seeks attorney fees for John Sullivan of $3,400. /Ffst, ere is no proof that 
Plaintiff incurred any such fee, Second, Mr. Sullivan is not an attamH of r cord nor to ID Pf', 
knowledge i, he licen,ed to practice Jaw in the State of Idaho. Thlrd,1i1 app s his function i"' 
limited to the Court~ordered mediation, which IDFG agreed to attend in Frfo . a. Furthennore, \he 
time and rate are wrreasonable for a mediation that Ja,ted approf if,atel four hours. ror 
respectfully requests that the Court disallow this claim. ! J j 
2. Charles Carpenter 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS A.ND FEES - Z 
001}0 
! I ! 
I / I 
! I I 
I I J SONLAWGROµP 
1
1 
l 03 B. Indiana, Suite A I 
pokane, WA 99207-23l17 lmL: (5 ) 835-SOOO FAX: (509~ 326-7503 
: i 
I I , I 









The Court has discretion to determine a reasonable rate fort· C 




IDFG does not intend to nitpick each of Mr. Carpenter's entries as the~ r+late his time on cert · n 
portions of the case. IDFG merely wishes to remind the Court thatit m4'kd i would consider i , 
incurred by Plaintiff after January 31, 2014.However> the Court should Jot co sider any time fr m 
March 3, 2016, forward. Mr. Carpenter's titne during this period was d+1ted t addressing JDl'i' s 
motion seeking a dismissal based upon the statutory emplo)'er' s immtf y. e Court 8"'."ted thls 
motion but awarded fees and costs based upon its detennination that tills moti n should have bJen 
filed on or before January 31, 2014. Without conceding this point,~. C enter would h Ive 
! 
incurred this time in responding to the motion irrespective of whe~ it w s filed. Pursuant to 
I 
! 
Plaintiffs memorandum, Mr. Carpenter spent 33:9 hours related to fj mot on. Based upon he 
I I 
requested hourly fee, attorney Carpenter's total should be reduced $9,f ~2. 
B. Expert Fees ! 
! 
1. :Mr. Stimpson and Mr. Grandy I \ 
IDFG is unable to address the amounts attributable to these expe,rts no invoices or ti e 
records were provided to review nor was any proof of payment subJJtted. n addition, I.R. 
I I 
54(d)(l)(C)(8)provides that expert costs are limited to $2,000perexpeJuhiess .R.C.P. 54(d)(l) ) 
•pplieo. JDFG respectfully requests that these expenses be limited to 1 t~ o $4,000. 
2. Mr. McPherson i \ 
I I 
The plaintiff indicates that Mr. McPherson was a consulting e~pert. ain, IDFG does tot 
have any basis to assess his cha,ges since he was never disclosed J ! ex ert of any type, ri, 
curriculum vitae has not been provided, no invoices or time records hav, r p vided and no fr 
I I I 
I 03 E- Indiana, Suite A I 
09/12 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DlSALLOW COSTS AND FEES - 3 
·1 I J SON LA w GR.OµP 
\ pokaoe, WA 99207-2311J 
1~L: (5 ) 83S-SOOO FAX: (509~ 326-7503 
I · I 
I I I 
J I I 







LAW OFFICES PAGE Hl/12 
I 
I 
. I I 
of pa)'lllent has been submitted. IDFG submits that this expense of $6
161 I. be disallowed 
c. Expenses I I 
I 
1. Mr. McPherson J 
Any expenses attributable to Mr. McPherson for the trip to DenieJ fort e depositions of Mr . 
. I 
Stimpson and Mr. Sommer should not be considered. These expenses Hpear o be $900. 
2. Helicopter Sto:i:age / I 
. I 
IDFG does not have any invoice or other accounting upon wffich to roperly analyze t is 
I I 
I I 









Attorney fees to disallow ($9,402 + $3,400) 
Expert witness fees to disallow (Mr. McPherson) 
Expenses to disallow 
Total 
















In addition, IDFG pm'iously paid costs awarded by the suPrf 1• Co rt in the amoun of 
$1,273.65. IDFG also paid $1,100 for the time charged by its exprlf, Co ·n Sommer, for e 
I ' I 1 I 
deposition taken by Plaintiff counsel because Plaintiff failed to pay fo\ 1is ti e. (See attached)[ 
Without waiving its position that the Court should not assess I any ee:s or costs, IDFG 
respectfully requests that the Court set a reasonable rate le<s than $28~ l ho for Mr. Ca,peJ., 
and that the Court disallow $36,104.99 from Plaintiffs memorandum befo e determining ~lat 
amount it will consider. 
DATED: June 20, 2016. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DIS.All.OW COSTS AND FEES - 4 




J SONLAWGROr I 103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
I I pokaue, WA 99207-2.31: 
ITifL: (50 ) 835-5000 FAX: (509/ 326-7503 
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Attorney for Deleq 
CERTIF1CATE OF SERVICE / j 
f~ i 
I hereby certify that on this 'H day ofJune, 2016, I caused to be •t rd a opy of the forego ng 
by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 1 
i 
Charles H. Carpenter 
Carpenter Law Firm, PLC 
210 N. Higgins A venue, Suite 336 
Missoula, MT 59802 
Phone: (406)543--0511 
Fax: (406) 258-0365 
jX:\l?o(l\T1iul Comt\PIJg\MEM- Di}~l!(,w ('.<,~t~ (20J6.QC••l?).wvd 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM .tN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES - 5 
i 
[ ] U.S. Mail I 
[ ] Hand Delivery i 
~ Facsimile I 1 
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~ AEROSCOPE, lNC. 
11901 Allison Street ·. · 
Broomfield co soo20 
303-46M414 Froc#: 303-46S-4116 
kdcan@aeroseopeinc.com 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Ste A 
Spokane, WA 99207 
·~ " ........... -..... ,••,.. .. . . . 
~ AEROSCOPE, INC. 
11901 Allison Street 
Broomfield CO 80020 
3/11/.2014 C, So.mmerTcstimonyHalfDay 
... :, . 
__.._ ............. _____ -------- · ..... _ .... ,· . . 
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Charles H. Cu:penter 
Idaho Bar No. 8322 
Carpenter Law Firm pk 
210 N. Higgins Avenue Suite 336 
Missoula, Montana 59802 
(406) 543-0511 
carpentc@carpenterki.wfumplc.com 
Attorney far Plaintiff 
Lewis County District Co .... , 
J~ILED _y 
A~01CLOCKJ-M 
JUN 2 9 2016 
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FISH AND GAME, and 











) ________ ) 
No. CV 12-146 
MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
TO DISAILOW CERTAIN COSTS 
Pursuant to the Court's order of June 1, 2016, Plaintiff Krinitt filed a verified 
memorandum of costs. The Idaho Department of Fish & Game ("Fish & Game") 
has objected to a number of these costs. Some of Fish & Game's objections are well 
taken and K.rinitt does not dispute them. This opposition is limited to three items in 
the motion: D.1 (attorney's fees) D.3(a) (McPherson's travel expenses) and E (a credit 
for payment to Mr. Sommer). 
Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter 4067217364 PAGE. 3 
With respect to attorney's fees, Fish & Grune makes three objections: it asks 
that John Sullivan's work in connection with the mediation be disallowed entirely, and 
that Charles Carpenter's rate be reduced, and certain time disallowed. With respect to 
Sullivan, Krinitt has limited his claim for costs to the legal work Sullivan did in 
connection with the mediation, which took place in Orange County, California. 
Carpenter found Sullivan's work to be valuable - see Exhibit A- and Fish & Game 
has no basis for claiming that it was not 
Krinitt objects to the assertion that Carpenter's standard hourly rate is 
unreasonably high. Attached hereto as exhibits B and C are filings made in other 
cases by other attorneys, a few years ago, which show Carpenter's rate to be within 
the reasonable range. Fish & Game also objects to fees and costs incurred in 
connection with its untimely Motion for Summary Judgment, on the grounds that 
these fees and costs would still have been incurred if Fish & Game had timely filed its 
motion. This is less than half right. Krinitt's counsel, and the Court, spent significant 
time and attention on the question whether Fish & Game had waived its statutory 
immunity defense by litigating fault all the way to the Supreme Court, blowing every 
deadline there was. Obviously this time, like the time arguing over fees, costs and 
whether there should be any sanction at all, would not have happened if Fish & Game 
had timely filed. 
Fish & Grune also objects to the travel costs associated with Richard 
McPherson, of Downrange. Mr. McPherson's assistance in connection with Fish & 
2 
00118 
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Game's Motion for Summary Judgment on fault was also valuable - see Exhibit A-
while his other work has not been included in the claim for costs. Fish & Game's 
counsel met Mr. McPherson at the depositions in Denver. 
Finally, Fish & Grune seeks a credit for the runounts it paid to its expert. The 
facts stated by Fish & Grune in connection with this payment are true, but it is not 
entitled to a credit. Had Krinitt paid Mr. Sommers' bill, he would have included the 
fee in his claim, and Fish & Grune would have to pay it As it is, the item, having 
already been paid by Fish & Game, is not included. This should not be a credit, 
because it is a wash. 
CONCLUSION 
PAGE. 4 
For the reasons given above, and in Fish & Game's motion, Krinitt's claim for 
costs and fees should be reduced by the amounts set forth in the motion at D.2 
($16,187.34) and D.5(6) ($3,772.00) and no further. 
DATED this 29th day of June, 2016. 
Respectfully ~~tted 
.;.,,/·.,·· __...,-·· --··- .. 
.. ).'.-'/' 
,,....-;, 
~a-rt;~s H. Carpenter 
(./ I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on the 29rh day of June, 2016, I served the foregoing by mailing, 
by fax and by email to: 
Peter J. Johnson 
JOHNSON LAW GROUP 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
4 
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Case 3:08-cv-0055L·-JL ?~»-~"D Document 247 Filed 02/14, ·- Page 1 of 28 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR Tiffi DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
KEVIN E. MAYS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TODD STOBIE, MIKE RIGNEY, 
DONALD BLAJR, JOHN 
HILDERBRAND, JOE 
RODRIGUEZ, DALE BUTTREY, 
JACK MCGEE, RICHARD SMITH, 
GABE RICHARDSON, JACLYN 
MARTIN, JAMIE ROMER, JODY 
BROWN, JACOB GUNTER, NEZ 
PERCE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, and 
the CITY OF LEWISTON, a 
municipality incorporated in the State 
of Idaho, 
Defendants. 





Following a six-day trial, the jury in this case returned a special verdict finding 
Defendant Donald Blair liable for using excessive force against Plaintiff Kevin Mays, and 
awarded damages in the amount of$1,954.27. (Dkt. 212.) This matter is before the Court 
on Plaintiffs Petition for Award of Attorney Fees, (Dkt. 218), in which Plaintiff seeks 
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in the amount of $439,678.26. Defendant Blair 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION -1 
0011:J 
Jun.28.2016 22:09 Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter 4067217364 PAGE. 7 
Case 3:08-cv-0055.t. _JL-cY'--~ Document 247 Filed 02/14, . Page 2 of 28 
filed an objection to Plaintiffs request for fees. (Dkt. 226.) The Court heard oral 
arguments on Plaintiff's petition on December 12, 2011. Having considered the parties' 
arguments, briefing, affidavits and other materials submitted in support of or in 
opposition to Plaintiffs petition, and for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned will 
recommend that the District Judge grant Plaintiffs petition in part and award $84,791.41 
in attorney's fees. 
BACKGROUND 
The facts and procedural history of this case are well known to the parties and the 
Court repeats them here only as necessary to resolve the fee petition. Plaintiff Kevin 
Mays brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officers Donald 
Blair, Mike Rigney, and Todd Stobie of the Lewiston Police Department and Deputies 
Joe Rodriguez and John Hildebrand of the Nez Perce County Sheriffs Department for 
events that occurred on December 23, 2006.1 On that date, the Lewiston Police 
Department received a call from Angel Harrell (Plaintiff's then girlfriend) who reported 
that Plaintiff may be suicidal and possibly in possession of a firearm. In response to the 
call, and acting in furtherance of their community care•taking function, Officers Rigney, 
Stobie, and Blair, and Deputies Hildebrand and Rodriguez removed Plaintiffs children 
from his home-placing them in the custody of Ms. Harrell-and confronted Plaintiff, who 
was located near the outskirts of Lewiston. 
1 In his original complaint, (Dkt. 1), Plaintiff also named the City of Lewiston and 
Nez Perce County as defendants. 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 2 
00120 
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Case 3:08-cv-0055~ JL -Pp~,,~ Document 247 Filed 02/14. Page 3 of 28 
During the confrontation, Plaintiff was forced to the ground, handcuffed, and 
searched. The search revealed that Plaintiff was not in possession of a firearm. When 
Plaintiff attempted to stand up after the search was complete, which the officers construed 
as resistence, one of the officers placed his knee in Plaintiff's back while another pressed 
Plaintiff's face into the ground and another used his Taser on Plaintiff. Plaintiff sustained 
a laceration on his head and was taken in an ambulance to the hospital. Plaintiff also 
received a citation for resisting arrest. After Plaintiff was tried for and acquitted of 
resisting arrest, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that he was wrongfully 
arrested and that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Plaintiff also pied state law claims, including battery and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
Plaintiffs initial complaint related only to the above incident. He later sought, and 
was granted, leave to amend his complaint to include claims in connection with a second 
incident that occurred on November 17, 2008, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Nez 
Perce County Jail on charges unrelated to the first incident. The amended complaint 
asserted claims against members of the Nez Perce County Sheriff's Department who 
allegedly beat Plaintiff or neglected him during his incarceration. The second incident did 
not involve the City of Lewiston or Officers Stobie, Rigney, Mundell, or Blair. In his 
motion for leave to amend, Plaintiff argued that, because he suffered head injuries during 
both incidents, and "the defendants responsible for the First Incident w[ ould] almost 
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certainly blame the defendants responsible for the Second Incident, and vice versa[,] ... 
[t]rying the[] incidents separately would create a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent and inequitable [results]." (Mem. in Supp. of Pl. 's Mot. 
for Leave to Amend Comp[. at 3, Dkt. 20-2.)2 
Plaintiff also attempted to amend his complaint to add claims related to a third 
incident that occurred on June 8, 2009, in which Plaintiff allegedly was harassed at his 
home by a Lewiston police officer. (Pl. 's Second Mot. to Amend Comp/., Dkt. 44.) 
Plaintiff later withdrew his motion to include claims related to the third incident. (Deel. of 
Jason Wood re: Mot. to Amend, Dkt. 67.) 
Prior to trial, Plaintiff's claims were significantly narrowed. Early in the litigation, 
the parties stipulated to the dismissal of Officer Joedy Mundell, (Dkt. 38), and Deputy 
Dustin Hibbard. (Dkt. 46.) As a result of dispositive motions, both govern.mental entities 
were dismissed, all claims related to the second incident were dismissed, and all other 
causes of action were dismissed with the exception of Plaintiffs excessive force claim 
related to the first incident. The case proceeded to trial on Plaintiff's excessive force 
claim against Officers Stobie. Rigney. and Blair. and Deputies Hilderbrand and 
Rodriguez. Officer Stobie was dismissed by the Court as a result of a motion for 
judgment as a matter oflaw at the close of Plaintiff's case in chief. (Dkt. 208.) 
2 Plaintiff later sought leave to replace fictitiously designated defendants that were 
named in the amended complaint with the names of eight employees of Nez Perce 
County, all of whom were allegedly involved in the second incident. (Dkt. 71.) The Court 
partially granted Plaintiffs motion on December 7, 2010. (Dkt. 99.) 
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At the close of the evidence, and after motions were addressed, closing arguments 
were made, jury instructions were given, the case was submitted to the jury and the jury 
was presented with a special verdict fonn. The special verdict fonn asked the jury to 
identify which, if any, of the individual officers and deputies had used excessive force. 
(Dkt. 212.) If the jury found any of the defendants had used excessive force, the special 
verdict form then asked the jury to identify what damages Plaintiff had suffered and left 
spaces open for the jury to fill in the amount of "Medical Expenses," "Other Non 
Economic Damages," and "Nominal Damages" as to each individual defendant. (Id.) The 
special verdict form also asked the jury to determine whether Plaintiff was entitled to an 
award of punitive damages. 
Of the remaining four defendants, the jury found that only Officer Blair had used 
excessive force and awarded Plaintiff $1,954.27 for medical expenses. (Dkt. 212.) The 
Jury also found that Plaintiff was not entitled to an award of punitive damages. Plaintiff 
now seeks an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in the amount of 
$439,678.26. 
DISCUSSION 
Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the 
court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in any 
action or proceeding brought to enforce the provisions of various civil rights statutes, 
including 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Congress' intent in enacting§ 1988 was to attract 
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competent counsel to prosecute civil rights cases, where 'victims ordinarily cannot afford 
to purchase legal services at the rates set by the private market.,,, Mendez v. County of 
San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008) ( quoting City of Riverside v. Rivera, 
477 U.S. 561, 576 (1986)). Under the terms of the statute, the plaintiff must be a 
"prevailing party" to recover an award of attorney's fees. "[P]laintiffs may be considered 
'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in 
litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Hensley 
v Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has made clear that, "[ e ]ven in a case where the 
'[p ]laintiff succeeded on only one of his many claims against Defendants,' ... the district 
court must nonetheless calculate a reasonable fee." Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1128. 
Generally, attorney's fees are calculated by multiplying the number of hours 
reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate-known as the 
"lodestar" calculation-and then, if necessary, making adjustments to the lodestar figure 
based upon the factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 
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197 5),3 that have not been subsumed in the lodestar calculation.4 Mendez v. County of San 
Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008). 
Defendant Blair concedes that Plaintiff is a prevailing party within the meaning of 
§ 1988. (Def 's Objection to Pl. 's Atty Fees at 2, Dkt. 226.) He argues, however, that this 
case falls within the exception to the general rule for plaintiffs who achieve purely 
technical success or receive de minimis relie£ Under this exception, the Court may forgo 
the lodestar analysis, Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359,362 (9th Cir. 1996), and 
Defendant Blair argues that the Court should significantly reduce the amount of requested 
fees-or deny the request in its entirety-because the amount of damages awarded by the 
jury in this case was minimal in comparison to the amount sought by Plaintiff. 
Alternatively, if the Court determines that the above exception does not apply, Defendant 
Blair argues that the time expended on the case and the hourly rates submitted by 
3 The twelve Kerr factors include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the 
complexity of the case; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the 
preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; ( 5) the 
customary fee; ( 6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by 
the client or other circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the 
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; 
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards 
in similar cases. 
4 "Among the subsumed factors presumably taken into account in either the 
reasonable hours component or the reasonable rate component of the lodestar calculation 
are: (1) the novelty and complexity of the issues, (2) the special skill and experience of 
counsel, (3) the quality of representation, ... (4) the results obtained, and (5) the 
contingent nature of the fee agreement." Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359,364 
n. 9 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION· 7 
Jun.28.2016 22:14 Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter 4067217364 PAGE. 13 
Case 3:08-cv-0055~ L-C~ Document 247 Filed 02/14, Page 8 of 28 
Plaintiff's counsel in connection with their request for fees are not reasonable and that the 
outcome of the case warrants a reduction in the amount of fees awarded. For the reasons 
discussed below, while the Court does not find that the outcome in this case brings it 
within the exception to the general rule for calculating attorney's fees, the Court does find 
that Plaintiff's requested fees are unreasonably high and will recommend that they be 
reduced. 
1. Plaintiff's success was neither ''purely technical" nor "de minimis" 
In Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), the United States Supreme Court created 
an exception to the general rule governing a district court's calculation of attorney's fees 
in civil rights cases. "The Court held that 'nominal damages' cases in which the relief is 
de minimis are exempted from the general requirements that govern the calculation of 
attorney's fees, including the requirement that a lodestar first be calculated." Morales, 96 
F.3d at 362 (citing Farrar, 506 U.S. at 116-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "The Farrar 
exception, which would allow the court to dispense with the calculation of a lodestar and 
simply establish a low fee or no fee at all, is limited to cases in which the civil rights 
plaintiff 'prevailed' but received only nominal damages and achieved only 'technical' 
success." Id. at 362-63. 
In this case, the jury found that Defendant Blair had used excessive force against 
Plaintiff and awarded $1,954.27 in compensatory damages for medical expenses incurred 
by Plaintiff. It is undisputed that the jury was instructed regarding nominal damages and 
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was given the option of awarding nominal damages, rejecting that option. 
Notwithstanding the award of compensatory damages, Defendant Blair contends that the 
award of medical expenses in this case was de minimis, and that the Court may award low 
fees or no fees at all under Farrar. The Court does not agree. The Ninth Circuit expressly 
has cautioned the district courts from stretching the Supreme Court's holding in Farrar 
beyond its scope. See Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d 644,648 (9th Cir. 2005). 
Farrar carved out an exception to the congressional mandate contained in 42 U.S.C. § 
1988-that the prevailing party in a civil rights action recuperate reasonable attorney's 
fees-where the jury finds a technical constitutional violation and only awards nominal 
damages. Here, Plaintiff's success can be considered neither purely technical nor de 
minimis. 
2. The Lodestar Calculation 
"The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is 
the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable 
hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). This is known as the 
lodestar calculation. Plaintiffs attorney Jason Wood submits that he devoted 964 hours to 
the case. He seeks attorney's fees for 819.8 hours of work (subtracting 144.2 hours of 
work spent exclusively on the second incident) at $300 per hour. (Dec. Of Jason Wood1,I 
15 and 16, Dkt. 219.) Plaintiff's attorney Gregory Rauch submits that he spent 750.40 
hours on the case and seeks attorney's fees for 712.30 hours of work (subtracting 38.1 
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hours of work spent exclusively on the second incident) at $250 per hour. (Dec. Of 
Gregory Rauch ,r 17, Dkt. 220.) Plaintiff also see.ks attorney's fees for work performed by 
two of Mr. Rauch's partners-Robert Magyar (34.6 hours at $200 per hour) and Brian Thie 
(13.7 hours at $200 per hour). (Id. at,r,r 19 and 20.) In sum, Plaintiff see.ks $433,675 in 
attorney's fees plus $6,003.26 in costs not available under District ofidaho Local Rule 
54.l(c)(l)- (9) (but which are available under§ 1988) for a total of$439,678.26. 
Defendant Blair argues that, even if the Court does not invoke the exception under 
Farrar for purely technical or de minimis success, the time expended and the hourly rates 
claimed by Plaintiff's attorneys are not reasonable and the fee award should be reduced to 
between 10'" 15 percent of the full amount requested due to Plaintiff's limited success. As 
more fully explained below, the Court agrees and will recommend that the fee award be 
reduced (although not to the extent requested by Defendant). 
A. Hourly Rate 
Reasonable attorney's fees under§ 1988 must be based upon a reasonable hourly 
rate. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The appropriate rate is the prevailing market rate "in 
the community for similar work perfonned by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, 
and reputation." Chalmers v. Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1986). 
"[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence in addition to the 
attorney's own affidavits that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the 
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience 
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and reputation." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. l I (1984). 
Plaintiffs counsel Jason Wood and Gregory Rauch both have submitted 
declarations in support of their petition for attorney's fees. In his declaration, Mr. Rauch 
states that he handles "[m]ostly divorce, misdemeanor and felony criminal matters at state 
level, bankruptcy, and small personal injury cases." (0kt. 220 at 2.) Mr. Rauch has been a 
member of the Idaho State Bar since 2007, and he states that his customary rate is $175 
per hour. (Id.) However, for more complicated matters, Mr. Rauch states that he charges 
$250 per hour, which is the rate he is seeking in this case. Mr. Rauch characterizes his 
role in this litigation as "second chair." It also is apparent from Mr. Rauch's declaration 
that, at the time of taking on this case, he was inexperienced in civil rights litigation, 
which, he indicates, is why he sought the assistance of more experienced counsel. 
Mr. Wood has been a member of the Idaho State Bar since 1994. (Dkt. 219 at 2.) 
In his declaration, Mr. Wood indicates that, since 2001, his practice has focused 
"primarily on representing plaintiffs throughout the State of Idaho, including civil rights 
cases involving excessive use of force by police officers" and that he has tried several 
cases to judgment. (Id.) Mr. Wood characterizes this case as complex due to the number 
of parties involved, multiple incidents, and the uncertainty as to damages. He also 
indicates that, "[f]rom the beginning of our representation of Kevin Mays, he has been 
unable to pay me or co-counsel, Mr. Rauch, on ~ hourly basis, nor reimburse us for any 
of the [sic] our out-of-pocket costs incurred in prosecuting this case." (Id. at 6.) Based 
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upon "the rate of what counsel presently charge for federal civil rights litigation and what 
other attorneys with similar skill, reputation and experience charge in the Coeur d'Alene 
area for similar work[,]" Mr. Wood states that his hourly rate is $300 per hour. 
Plaintiffs counsel also have submitted the declaration of Leander James in support 
of their fee petition. (Dec. Of Leander L. James, VJ, Dkt. 221.) Mr. James is an attorney 
in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, and specializes in complex civil litigation, including civil rights 
litigation. He has been a member of the Idaho Bar since 1993. He states that his "hourly 
fee schedule for plaintiff's litigation and trial work ranges from a minimum of $200/hr. to 
a maximum of $325/hr." (Id. at 15.) Mr. James indicates that his rate is based upon a 
number of factors, including the complexity of the case. (Id.) He states that, "[b]ased on 
my personal knowledge of the experience, expertise, and abilities of Mr. Wood and of 
prevailing and customary hourly fee rates in the Coeur d'Alene area for attorneys sharing 
similar experience, reputation, and expertise, in complex and difficult cases of this kind, it 
is my opinion that an hourly rate of $300.00 per hour at the present time is warranted 
under the circumstances and well within the range of customary rates of attorneys in this 
area." (Id. at ,I 10.) Mr. James indicates that "the long delays in receiving compensation, 
and the inability of the plaintiffs to pay for costs, all make a substantial hourly fee 
appropriate." (Id. at, 13.) Mr. James also opines that $250 per hour is a reasonable 
hourly rate for Mr. Rauch. 
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In opposition to Plaintiff's motion for fees, and contrary to the declarations of 
Messrs. Wood, Rauch, and James, Defendant Blair contends that the case was not 
particularly complex, stating that the "case involved a 1-2 second 'scuffle' and raised the 
question of whether excessive force was used when Mr. Mays sustained a small laceration 
and a black eye." (!)ef Blair's Obj. to Pl. 's Att'y Fees at 5, Dkt. 226.) Defendant 
contends that the only complications in this case were of Plaintiff's counsel's own 
making, stating that "[t]his case was not complex until the Plaintiff and/or his counsel 
tried to 'stretch' this case by adding a 'second' incident and claimed injuries which were 
not identified in the medical ~ecords." (Id.) (emphasis in original). Defendant's point is 
well taken and, as discussed more fully below, the Court will recommend that the hours 
spent on aspects of the case unrelated to the "first incident" not be included in the award 
of fees. 
However, the Court does not fully agree with Defendant Blair's contention that 
this case involved no complexities. Contrary to Defendant Blair's characterization, the 
first incident did not involve a "garden variety" case of excessive force where officers are 
acting in their law enforcement capacity. Indeed, this case involved a somewhat murky 
situation in which the officers were acting pursuant to their community care-taking 
function. Moreover, the first incident involved multiple law enforcement officers from 
two different agencies and, due to the nature of the incident, Plaintiff was unable to 
identify which officer did what to him while he was on the ground. This scenario required 
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discovery outside the realm of what can be considered a garden variety excessive force 
case and warrants consideration in determining a reasonable fee award in this case. 
PAGE. 19 
Based on the above, the undersigned finds that Mr. Wood's hourly rate of $300 per 
hour is reasonable and will use that rate in detennining the lodestar figure. However, 
based upon Mr. Rauch's experience and the materials filed in support of and in opposition 
· to Plaintiff's motion for fees, the Court fmds that Mr. Rauch's hourly rate should not 
exceed $175 per hour. This finding is based upon Mr. Rauch' s limited experience (having 
only 4-5 years experience and little or no experience with the type of case at bar), his role 
in the litigation as second chair, Mr. Rauch' s own customary hourly rate, and the 
prevailing rate in the community. The Court finds Mr. James' declaration particularly 
instructive on this issue, in which Mr. James indicates that his minimum rate in such cases 
is $200 per hour. Mr. James has been practicing over 20 years longer than Mr. Rauch and 
has substantial experience in this type of case. Mr. Rauch' s claimed rate of $250 per hour 
is unreasonably high and the Court will base the lodestar figure for Mr. Rauch based upon 
an hourly rate of $17 5 per hour. 
B. Hours Reasonably Expended 
Under§ 1988, prevailing parties may only be compensated for those hours of work 
that were "reasonably expended." See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34. The moving party 
bears the burden of establishing the hours claimed and must carry that burden by 
submitting adequate documentation of those hours. Id. at 437. The Court will not grant a 
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fee award for "hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Id. at 433-
34. It is well settled that a "plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney's fees even for claims 
on which she did not prevail, if they 'involve a common core of facts or are based on 
related legal theories."' Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1125-26. Conversely, a plaintiff is not 
entitled to an award of fees for unsuccessful claims that were "unrelated to" the 
successful claims. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. 
Mr. Wood states in his declaration that he "necessarily and reasonably devoted 964 
hours of work to the prosecution of this case." (Dkt. 219 at 5.) Plaintiff, however, is not 
seeking reimbursement for time spent exclusively on the "second incident." Mr. Wood 
represents that he spent 144.2 hours exclusively on the second incident and therefore only 
seeks compensation for 819.8 hours. (Id.) Mr. Rauch represents that he spent 750.4 hours 
on the case and 38.1 hours exclusively on the second incident. Thus, Mr. Rauch seeks 
compensation for 712.3 hours of work. 
Defendant Blair objects to the number of hours claimed by Plaintiffs attorneys on 
several grounds. Each will be addressed below. 
(1) Time Spent on Second Incident 
Plaintiff's counsel do not seek compensation for hours spent on the second 
incident. Defendant Blair contends, however, that Plaintiff's counsel have not excluded 
all of the hours spent on the second incident and seeks a reduction of207.2 hours. In 
support of this argument, Defendant Blair has submitted two exhibits highlighting the 
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hours spent on the second incident by attorneys Wood and Rauch that Defendant 
contends should have been excluded. (Time Attributable to Second Incident (Wood), 
Exhibit A, Dkt. 226-1 pp. 1-7; Time Attributable to Second Incident (Rauch}, Dkt. 226-1 
pp. 8-11.) 
PAGE. .!l 
Having carefully reviewed Plaintiffs counsel's billing records, the Court finds that 
a reduction of 207 .2 hours of time spent on the second incident is warranted. 5 Defendant 
Blair has supplied the Court with a copy of Plaintiffs counsel's billing records, 
highlighting the hours spent on the second incident by Messrs. Wood and Rauch, and the 
Court will not go through the individual billing entries again here. However, the Court 
will recommend that Mr. Wood's hours be reduced by 186 hours and Mr. Rauch's hours 
be reduced by 21.2 hours. 
(2) Time Spent on Third Incident 
Like the hours claimed for the second incident, Defendant Blair argues that 
Plaintiff's counsel should not be compensated for hours spent working on the third 
incident. 
As indicated above, Plaintiff sought leave to amend his: complaint to include 
claims concerning a third incident in which Sergeant Piche of the Lewiston Police 
5 This includes time for work relating to neurological damages. Plaintiffs 
attorneys have argued that the time spent on assessing Plaintiff's neurological damages 
cannot be allocated exclusively to either the first or second incidents because Plaintiff 
sustained head injuries during both incidents. At trial, however, Plaintiffs expert did not 
opine that Plaintiff sustained any neurological damages as a result of the first incident. 
The Court will recommend that the time spent on this issue be excluded. 
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Department allegedly harassed Mr. Mays. (Second Mot. To Amend Complaint, Dkt. 44.) 
Other than the fact that the third incident involved an officer from the Lewiston Police 
Department, the incident had no bearing on Plaintiffs claims concerning the first 
incident. Ultimately, Plaintiff withdrew his attempt to add a claim related to the third 
incident. (Deel. of Jason Wood re: Mot. to Amend, Dkt. 67.) 
Defendant Blair has submitted an exhibit outlining the hours spent by Plaintiff's 
counsel on the third incident, which Defendant seeks to exclude. (Time Attributable to 
Third Incident, Exhibit B, Dkt. 226-1 pp. 12-13.) The exhibit shows that Mr. Wood spent 
22. 7 hours on the third incident and Mr. Rauch spent 2.3 hours on third incident. The 
Court agrees that the third incident was not factually or legally related to Plaintiff's 
successful claims and the hours spent on the incident should not be included in Plaintiff's 
award of attorney's fees. Mr. Wood's time will be reduced by an additional 22.7 hours 
and Mr. Rauch's time will be reduced by an additional 2.3 hours. 
(3) Claim Against Defendant Joedy Mundell 
Early in the litigation, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of Officer Joedy 
Mundell, who was named as a defendant in Plaintiff's initial complaint. The stipulation 
states that each party is to bear his or her own attorney's fees and costs concerning the 
dismissed claim. (Stip. For Dismissal of Officer Joedy Mundell, Dkt. 38.) Defendant Blair 
has pointed out that Mr. Wood billed 1.1 hours related to the claim against Officer 
Mundell and Mr. Rauch billed .2 hours related to the claim against Officer Mundell. 
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Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the Court will recommend that these hours be 
subtracted from Plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees. 
(4) Time Spent Communicating and Responding to Discovery and 
Information from Nez Perce County 
PAGE. 23 
Defendant Blair argues that the time spent on communications and responses to 
Nez Perce County's pleadings, motions, briefs and interaction with the County's attorney 
should be excluded from Plaintiff's award of attorney's fees. Defendant Blair seeks the 
exclusion of these hours based on the ground that the jury did not make any finding 
against the County or any of its deputies, and the Plaintiff did not prevail on those claims. 
The Court disagrees. 
It is undisputed that Deputy Jose Rodriguez and Sgt. John Hilderbrand of the Nez 
Perce County Sheriff's Department were involved in the first incident and that Plaintiff 
brought suit against the officers and the County based on that involvement. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff did not prevail against the County or officers 
Rodriguez or Hilderbrand, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees for the hours spent on the 
claims against the County and its officers related to the first incident. Mendez, 540 F .3d at 
1126 ("A plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney's fees even for claims on which she did 
not prevail, if they involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal 
theories.") Plaintiff's counsel have represented that they excluded the hours exclusively 
spent on the second incident and the Court has excluded additional hours pointed out by 
Defendant Blair that remained in Plaintiff's counsel's billing directly attributable to the 
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second incident. 
(5) Reduction for Duplicative and Excessive Hours 
Defendant Blair argues that some of the hours claimed by Plaintiff's attorneys are 
either duplicative or excessive. Specifically, Defendant points out that Mr. Wood and Mr. 
Rauch both claimed time for attending the depositions of the same witnesses. Defendant 
also argues that the following claimed hours are excessive: 36 hours spent by Mr. Rauch 
preparing the initial complaint; 24 hours spent by Mr. Rauch working on closing 
argument; and 24 hours spent preparing for closing argument by Mr. Wood. 
Plaintiff agrees that he should not receive an award of fees for time Mr. Rauch 
spent on depositions that Mr. Wood also attended. Similarly, Plaintiff does not object to 
reducing Mr. Rauch's time for the initial complaint to IO hours. However, Plaintiff does 
talce issue with Defendant Blair's argument that the time spent on closing arguments was 
excessive. On this issue, the Court will defer to Plaintiff's counsel's judgment. Moreno v. 
City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) ("By and large, the court should 
defer to the winning lawyer's professional judgment as to how much time he was required 
to spend on the case .... "). 
Based on the above, and having reviewed Defendant Blair's exhibits highlighting 
the hours he claims are excessive or duplicative, (Dkt. 226-2 pp. 7-8), the Court agrees 
that 38.1 hours should be excluded from Mr. Rauch's time. The Court, however, does not 
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agree that 18 hours should be excluded from Mr. Wood's time. 6 
(6) Mr. Wood's Travel Time 
The facts giving rise to this litigation occurred in North Idaho. After 
unsuccessfully seeking local lead counsel to help him with the case, Mr. Rauch accepted 
the assistance of Mr. Wood, who lives in Southeastern Idaho. It appears that Mr. Wood 
made approximately eight trips from Idaho Falls, Idaho, to North Idaho in preparation for 
this case. Mr. Wood drove on all but one of these trips-each taking approximately eight 
hours. Defendant Blair objects to these hours, arguing that it was unnecessary for Mr. 
Wood to travel to North Idaho because co-counsel already was located there. Defendant 
Blair also argues that Mr. Wood's driving time is excessive-pointing out that Mr. Wood 
flew to Lewiston on one occasion and that it only took five hours as opposed to eight. 
The Court disagrees with Defendant Blair's suggestion that Mr. Wood's time in 
North Idaho should be entirely excluded because co-counsel was already located there. 
The Court has recognized that Mr. Rauch was inexperienced in this matter and adjusted 
his hourly rate accordingly. The fact that Mr. Wood traveled to North Idaho to prepare for 
this case is not in itself unreasonable. However, the Court does agree that the driving time 
is excessive and each trip to and from North Idaho will be reduced to five hours, which is 
the time it took Mr. Wood to fly to Lewiston. Thus, having reviewed Defendant Blair's 
6 Defendant Blair also states that 2.8 hours claimed by Mr. Wood appear to be 
clerical errors and that 4.5 hours claimed by Mr. Rauch appear to be clerical errors. The 
Court agrees, and these hours will be excluded. 
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exhibit highlighting Mr. Wood's travel time, (Dkt. 226-2 at 9), the Court will subtract 35 
hours attributable to Mr. Wood's travel time. 
(7) Time Spent on Criminal Prosecution 
Mr. Rauch seeks compensation for 67.6 hours spent working on Mr. Mays' 
criminal prosecution for resisting arrest. Plaintiff argues that "[i]t was necessary for Mays 
to obtain a dismissal of the criminal charges of resisting arrest; otherwise his section 1983 
claim would have been barred.'' (Reply to Def Blair's Obj. To Pl. 's Atty Fees at 16, 0kt. 
235.) While this may be true, the Ninth Circuit ~as indicated that these hours may not be 
claimed under§ 1988. Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(explaining that attorney's fees for time spent in defending criminal charge prior to 
bringing an action under§ 1983 may be claimed as damages in the civil rights suit, but 
that they may not be claimed as attorney's fees under§ 1988). Based on Borunda, the 
time Mr. Rauch spent on Plaintiff's criminal charge (67.6 hours) will be excluded. 
(8) Time Spent on Claims of On-Going Harassment 
Plaintiff's counsel have submitted entries seeking compensation for time spent 
pertaining to Plaintiff's allegations that he was being harassed continually by the 
Lewiston police. Defendant Blair seeks the exclusion of this time as it was unrelated to 
the claims on which Plaintiff prevailed. The Court agrees and will exclude 1. 7 hours from 
Mr. Rauch's compensable time and 1.3 hours from Mr. Wood's compensable time. 
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(9) Hours Claimed by Mr. Magyar and Mr. Thie 
Plaintiff seeks attorney's fees for work done by Mr. Rauch' s partners Robert 
Magyar and Brian Thie. Mr. Magyar claims a total of34.6 hours at $200 per hour and Mr. 
Thie claims 13. 7 hours at $200 per hour. Defendant Blair objects to an award of 
attorney's fees for both of Mr. Rauch's partners for several reasons. As explained below, 
the undersigned will recommend that both attorneys' hours be reduced. 
Concerning Mr. Magyar, 23.4 of the 34.6 hours claimed relate to Mr. Mays' 
criminal proceedings. As discussed above, those hours are not compensable for the 
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The remaining 11.2 hours appear to relate to Plaintiff's 
claims in this action. However, while Mr. Rauch's declaration states that Plaintiff is 
seeking $200 per hour for Mr. Magyar's work, the billing entries attached to Mr. Rauch's 
declaration show that Mr. Magyar billed at a rate of $150 per hour. The undersigned will 
recommend that Plaintiff be awarded attorney's fees for 11.2 hours of Mr. Magyar's work 
at $150 per hour. 
With respect to Mr. Thie, Defendant Blair objects to three entries that appear to be 
clerical errors. For instance, Mr. Thie claims 1.5 hours of work on June 24, 2011. This 
case, however, was completed on June 23, 2011, and Defendant argues that this time 
should be excluded. The Court agrees. Similarly, Mr. Thie claims 3 hours of work on 
May 20, 2011, for work done reviewing and editing a motion for summary judgment. The 
deadline for summary judgment briefing, however, had expired in April of 2011 and 
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Plaintiff filed his reply to Defendants' motion for summary judgment on April 30, 2011. 
It will be recommended that these hours be excluded. Finally, Mr. Thie's billing sheet 
contains an entry for research on res ipsa loquitar [sic] and ''joint liability theories." (Dkt. 
220 at 36.) This entry appears to be related to another case and the 2.5 hours claimed for 
the work will be excluded. Thus, the undersigned will recommend that 8 of the 13.7 hours 
claimed by Mr. Thie be exluded and that Mr. Thie's time be compensated at $150 per 
hour-the same rate as Mr. Magyar. 
(C) Results Obtained 
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 242 (1983), the Supreme Court held that if the 
party seeking attorney's fees has not succeeded on all claims, the district court should 
award only an amount that is reasonable in relation to the results of the suit. If the results 
are excellent despite the less than complete success, the fee movant should obtain a fully 
compensatory fee, including compensation for hours devoted to the claims that were 
ultimately unsuccessful. Id. at 434. In the absence of "excellent" results, however, a fully 
compensatory fee may be excessive, and the district court should reduce the lodestar 
figure to account for the limited success. Id. There is no rule or formula for making a 
reduction; rather, it is within the discretion of the district court to determine a reasonable 
fee. Id. at 436-37 ("There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations. 
The district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it 
may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success. The court necessarily has 
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discretion in making this equitable judgment.") 
Defendant Blair argues that Plaintiffs award of attorney's fees should be 
significantly reduced given his limited success. Defendant Blair "submits that this Court 
would be justified in awarding the Plaintiff 10 - 15 % or less of the amount of attorney fee 
claimed once the appropriate number of hours are identified." (Def Blair's Obj. To Pl. 's 
Att'y Fees at 9) (emphasis in original). The undersigned agrees that Plaintiff's award of 
attorney's fees should be adjusted to account for Plaintiff's limited success, but not to the 
extent sought by Defendant Blair. 
In his initial complaint, Plaintiff brought suit against four police officers employed 
by the City of Lewiston and three deputies employed by Nez Perce County Sheriff's 
Department. Plaintiff also sought relief against the City and the County. All of the claims 
in the initial complaint related to the first incident. Plaintiff's initial complaint sought 
$1.5 million in compensatory, punitive, incidental, and consequential damages. Plaintiff 
later amended his complaint, however, and did not seek any specific amount. 
The case proceeded to trial against five officers involved in the first incident. 
During closing arguments, Plaintiff's counsel suggested that Mr. Mays' general damages 
may be worth $200,000 to $300,000. The jwy found that only Officer Blair had used 
excessive force and the jwy awarded Plaintiff $1,954.27 in compensatory damages for 
medical expenses. 
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Defendant Blair suggests that an 85 - 90% reduction is appropriate in this case. In 
support of this contention, Defendant Blair points out that Plaintiff only succeeded 
against one of eight defendants, which is a 12.5% success rate. Defendant Blair also 
points out that the initial figure of $1.5 million requested in comparison with the 
$1,956.27 recovered is 0.13%. The Court finds that the results obtained in this case 
cannot be considered "excellent" and that a fully compensatory fee would be excessive in 
this case under Hensley. The question is how much the award should be reduced to 
account for Plaintiff's limited success. 
The Court does not agree that Plaintiffs award should be reduced by 85 - 90%. 
The verdict against Defendant Blair finding that he had used excessive force during the 
welfare check conferred a benefit on the public and possesses some value. As the Ninth 
Circuit found in Morales v. City of San Rafael, the litigation in this case served the 
significant public policy interest "of helping to protect [Plaintiff] and persons like him 
from being subjected to similar unlawful treatment in the future" and the verdict 
"constitutes a warning to law-enforcement officers not to treat civilians 
unconstitutionally." 96 F.3d at 364-65. 
The Court finds that the percentages provided by Defendant Blair are a useful 
starting point. Plaintiff succeeded against one of eight defendants equaling 12.5% and on 
one claim out of six equaling 16.66%. Using these figures as a starting point and giving 
Plaintiff a bump in fees in recognition of the public benefit conferred by the verdict in this 
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case, the Court will recommend that the lodestar calculation include a 75% reduction to 
account for Plaintiff's limited success. 
Talcing into consideration the reductions outlined above and the reduction for 
limited success, the Court will recommend a lodestar calculation as follows: 
Jason Wood 
964 total hours claimed 
- 186 (Second Incident) 
- 22. 7 (Third Incident) 
- 1.1 ( claim against Mundell) 
-2.8 (clerical errors) 
- 35 (excessive travel time) 
- 1.3 ( on going harassment) 
715.1 Revised total hours 
PAGE. 31 
715.1 x $300 per hour= $214,530.00 x 0.25 for limited success adjustment 
= $53,632.50 
Gregory Rauch 
750.40 total hours claimed 
- 21.2 (Second Incident) 
- 2.3 (Third Incident) 
- 0.2 ( claim against Mundell) 
- 38.1 (duplicative or excessive hours) 
- 4.5 (clerical errors) 
- 67.6 (criminal case) 
- I. 7 ( on going harassment) 
- 34.6 (Mr. Magyar's hours) 
- 13.7 (Mr. Thie's hours) 
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566.5 Revised total hours7 
566.5 x $175 per hour= $99,137.50 x 0.25 for limited success adjustment 
= $24,784.40 
Robert Magyar 
34.6 total hours claimed 
- 23 .4 ( criminal case) 
11.2 Revised total hours 
11.2 x $150 per hour= $1,680.00 x 0.25 for limited success adjustment 
=$420 
Brian Thie 
13. 7 total hours claimed 
- 7 (cleric.al errors) 
6.7 Revised total hours 
6.7 x $150 per hour= $1,005.00 x 0.25 for limited success adjustment 
-$251.25 
$79,088.15 Total Lodestar Figure 
PAGE. 32 
$79,088.15 + $5,703.26 (adjusted costs)8 = $84,791.41 (total recommend attorney's 
7 Because the Court has determined that Messrs. Magyar and Thie are entitled to 
an hourly rate different from that of Mr. Rauch, the Court has completely deducted their 
hours from Mr. Rauch's lodestar calculation and reassesses them according to their own 
rate below. 
8 This figure represents adjusted costs recoverable under § 1988 but not taxable as 
costs under Local Rule 54.1. Defendant Blair objected to Mr. Rauch claiming service 
costs, which are provided for under the Federal Rules. The Court agrees that this item 
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fee award) 
RECOMMENDATION 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 
Plaintiffs Petition for Award of Attorney Fees (Dkt. 218) be GRANTED IN 
PART and that Plaintiff be awarded $84,791.41 in attorney's fees and costs under 42 
u.s.c. § 1988. 
Written objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within 
fourteen (14) days pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l) and Dist. Idaho L. Rule 72.l(b), or 
as a result of failing to do so, that party may waive the right to raise factual and/or legal 
objections to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
DATED: February 14, 2012 
~ 
Honorable Candy W. Dale 
Chief United States Magistrate Judge 
should not have been included and has subtracted $300 from Plaintiffs costs. The 
undersigned has reviewed the remainder of Plaintiffs non-taxable costs and finds them 
compensable. 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 28 
00146 
PAGE. 33 
Jun.28.2016 22:31 Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter 4067217364 
Case 3:08-cv-0055. _JL-;~ Document 219 Filed 07/1, I Page 1 of 8 
T. Jason Wood, Esq., TSR#5016 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls ID 83404 
Telephone: (208) 522-1230 
Gregory R. Rauch, ISB# 7389 
THE LAW OFFICES OF MAGYAR & RAUCH, PLLC 
PO Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Tel: (208) 882-1906 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
KEVJN E. MAYS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TODD STOBIE, et al., 
Defendants. 
IN TIIE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 










Case No. CV08-552-C-EJL-CWD 
DECLARATION OFT. JASON WOOD 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A WARD 
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
I, T. Jason Wood, declare under penalty of perjury, as follows: 
PAGE. 34 
1. I am a member of Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC, attorneys for Plaintiff in 
this matter and I make this affidavit from personal knowledge. 
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2. I have been a member of the Idaho State Bar since September 1994. I am also 
admitted to practice before the United States District Court for the District ofidaho, and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
3. I was a law clerk to United States Magistrate Judge Lany M. Boyle from May 1994 
through July 1995, where I assisted Judge Boyle in numerous civil rights cases. 
4. Since 1995 I have practiced in the law firm of Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC, 
in Idaho Falls, Idaho., an eight-member finn. I have been a shareholder in the firm since 2001. 
5. I was on the Regional Board of Directors for the Idaho Trial Lawyer's Association 
from 2005-2010.. I served on its Executive Committee as ITLA' s Secretary 2010-2011, and I am 
currently its Treasurer. 
6. Initially my practice was wide-ranging, including civil and criminal defense, family · 
law, and civil plaintiff's work. Since 2001, my practice narrowed to focus primarily on representing 
plaintiffs throughout the State ofldaho, including civil rights cases involving excessive use of force 
by police officers. I have tried several cases to judgment, and have briefed and argued several cases 
before the Idaho Court of Appeals, Idaho Supreme Court, and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, two 
of them civil rights cases.1 
7. I first became involved in this case as counsel for Plaintiff Kevin Mays in December 
2008 at the request of my co-counsel, Gregory Rauch, who sought someone with expertise in civil 
rights litigation. I officially became lead counsel ofrecord on February 3, 2009. (See Doc. 3). 
1Including: Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 879 P.2d 1165 (1999); Hindmarsh v. Mock, 
2001 Ida.App. LEXIS 113 (Mayl7,2001); Clarkv. Raty, 137Idaho343,48P.3d672(2002);Kage/ 
v. U.S. Anny Corps of Eng'rs, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8511, No. 98-35697 (91b Cir.) (civil rights); 
Dickson v. Scoville, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8511, No. 98-36062 (9th Cir.); Decoria v. County of 
Jefferson, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10788, No. 07-36066) (civil rights). 
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8. I decided to take this case knowing few, if any, attorneys would be willing to 
undertake such representation because of the difficulties inherent in Plaintiff's case, because ofldaho 
juries' reluctance to find against law enforcement officers, particularly where plaintiffs have a 
criminal history and extensive damages are not clear. In undertaking representation of Plaintiff, 
despite the aforementioned difficulties, I also knew that if I did not prevail I would not be 
compensated for my efforts nor reimbursed for my out-of-pocket costs advanced during the course 
of the litigation. 
9. Upon carefully reviewing the evidence of Plaintiff's mental condition following both 
the First Incident (December 23, 2006) and the Second incident (November 17, 2009), I determined 
the complaint should be amended to add the Second Incident. The primary reason for joining the 
Second Incident with the First Incident was that Plaintiff sustained head injuries in both incidents, 
and the evidence suggested neuro-cognitive injury that could have been caused by either or both 
incidents. The risk was that the defendants responsible for the First Incident would point the finger 
at the defendants responsible for the Second Incident for causing Plaintiffs brain damage, and vice 
versa. Had the claims not been joined, the result thereby could have been that both sets of 
defendants would either be held responsible for Plaintiff's brain damage, or neither of them, simply 
by blaming the other. (See Docs. 20-3; 24 at 4-5). 
10. The defendants did in fact follow this tactic, suggesting throughout these proceedings 
the cumulative effects of trauma to Plaintiff's head, other than the incidents alleged in the complaint, 
may have caused or contributed to Plaintiff's current mental and visual problems. ( See, e.g., Docs. 
107-1; 115-15). Therefore I was, and remain, of the opinion that in order to prosecute Plaintiff's 
claim based on the First Incident it was necessary to pursue the Second Incident in the same case. 
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11. Nevertheless, I kept detailed records of the time I spent in this case exclusively on the 
Second Incident to the extent possible. The amount of time spend exclusively on the Second 
Incident was 144.2 hours. These hours appear underlined in my attached billing records. 
12. The time I spent devoted to this case was significant due not only to the factual, legal, 
and evidentiary complexity of the case, but because of the large number of witnesses identified in 
discovery as witnesses with knowledge ( over 75), the number of expert witnesses offering opinions 
on diverse and complex issues (13), the number of depositions taken (22), the thousands of pages 
of documents produced and generated in discovery and in litigation in this case, the time required 
for the several trips I was required to take from Idaho Falls to Lewiston, Moscow, and Coeur d'Alene 
for this case, and the necessity of being prepared to go to trial on all issues and evidence until the 
Court issued its 06/01/11 decision on the defendants• motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 162). 
13. The hours listed are based upon contemporaneous records which I personally kept as 
I did the work. All of the hours listed were reasonable and necessary to the prosecution of this case. 
I have exercised billing judgment and excluded many hours. 
14. Mr. Rauch acted as c~counsel in th is matter. He played a supportive but crucial role 
throughout this case, especially during summary judgment proceedings and the &-day trial of this 
matter, examining almost half the witnesses in our case, cross-examining almost half the defense 
witnesses. I reviewed and edited documents he prepared and filed with the Court. but his work was 
not duplicative of my own. Although I took most of the depositions on behalf of Plaintiff in this 
case, we othetwise divided most of the work. For example, Mr. Rauch was primarily responsible 
for briefing in opposition to the defendants' motions for summary judgment regarding the First 
Incident, while I was responsible for all the briefing and work regarding the Second Incident. 
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Because of the tremendous amount of time and money Plaintiffs' counsel must personally invest in 
a case like this, with the possibility of payment contingent on the final outcome in the distant, Mr. 
Rauch and I had every motivation to, and in fact did, use our best efforts not to duplicate our efforts 
or waste our precious resources on issues or time we believed would not benefit the case. 
15. The hourly rate claimed for my time submitted with this Affidavit is $300 per hour. 
This hourly rate is based upon the rate of what counsel presently charge for federal civil rights 
litigation and what other attorneys with similar skill, reputation and experience charge in the Coeur 
d'Alene area for similar work. It also reflects the rates in similar cases charged by attorneys with 
similar skill, reputation and experience in the federal District of Idaho. See Affidavits of Walt 
Sinclair and Kurt Hozler attached to the Memorandum filed in support of Plaintiff's petition for 
attorney fees. See also LaPeter v. Canada Life Ins. Co., Case No. CV-06-121-S-BLW, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 40263, **7-9 (D. Idaho, May 11, 2009); Suter v. National Rehab Partners, Inc., Case 
No. CV03-15-S-BLW (2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70952, **9-10 (D. Idaho, Sept. 24, 2007). 
16. An itemization of my attorney time, expended in this action is attached to this 
Declaration as Exhibit 1. I have necessarily and reasonably devoted 964 hours of work to the 
prosecution of this case, both the First and Second Incidents, at the hourly rate of $300/hr. As 
previously indicated, damage issues regarding injuries to Plaintiff's brain and left eye in both 
incidents were clearly intertwined, and therefore it was necessary to join the Second Incident with 
the First. Nevertheless, Plaintiff is not seeking reimbursement for time spent exclusively on the 
Second incident. The total hours spent exclusively on the Second incident was 144.2 hours. 
Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for time necessarily and reasonably spent on the First Incident only, 
which for me was 819.8 hours, and for Mr. Rauch was 712.30. 
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17. From the beginning of our representation of Kevin Mays, he has been unable to pay 
me or co-counsel, Mr. Rauch, on an hourly basis, nor reimburse us for any of the our out-of-pocket 
costs incurred. in prosecuting this case. 
18. Virtually all the time I devoted to prosecuting Plaintiff's claims against all other 
defendants than Donald Blair, pertaining to the First Incident set forth in the Amended Complaint, 
were necessary for, and directly benefitted, Plaintiff's claims against Donald Blair. Donald Blair was 
the supervising law enforcement officer on the scene, the most experienced, and he was the officer 
most involved in the excessive use of force against Plaintiff on December 23, 2006. Plaintiff was 
face down on the ground when the officers struck him and, consequently, he could not identify who 
used what force against him. Throughout this litigation the defendants, including Blair, contended 
that they did not strike Plaintiff with a blunt object, and that Plaintiff had failed to identify any 
specific action by the any of the individual defendants that caused his injuries. (See, e.g., Docs. 107-
1 at 10; 124 at 3-7). They also contended at trial that Plaintiff was intoxicated and therefore could 
not recall what happened to him. Therefore it was absolutely necessary to Plaintiff's claims against 
Blair to conduct all the discovery Plaintiff's counsel conducted in this case regarding all witnesses 
to the incident, any investigations pertaining thereto, damages, and to obtain expert opinions from 
David Neal regarding use of force and damages. Likewise, because Plaintiff could not identify 
which officer did what to him, he was required to name all officers in close proximity and defend 
motions for summary judgment by such officers. (See Doc. 116 at 24-28). Furthermore, the trial 
testimony of each of the individual defendants other than Blair were crocial to obtaining the 
judgment against defendant Blair. It is simply impossible to separately identify time devoted solely 
to claims against defendant Blair for the claims made against the other defendants which were 
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unsuccesful, since such claims arose from a common nucleus of operative facts as the claims against 
the other defendants originally named in the First Incident, and such claims were inextricably 
intertwined with one another. 
19. Plaintiff also seeks $4,268.80 in costs that could not be included in Plaintiffs Bill of 
Costs, but which I have incurred and normally would be required to pay, in addition to the attorney 
fees, including travel expenses such a mileage, rental cars, meals, and lodging, as set forth in the 
underlined, italicized and bolded entries on the last 3 pages of the Exhibit I attached hereto, and 
which are therefore awardable as a component of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct under the laws of the 
United States to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Dated this 141h day of July, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 14, 2011, I filed the foregoing electronically through the 
CM.IECF system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, 
as more fully reflected on the Notice of Electronic Filing: 
BRIAN K. JULIAN 
(bjulian@ajhlaw.com) 
CHRIS H. HANSEN 
( chhansen@ajhlaw.com) 
SONY ALEE R. NUTSCH 
(snutsch@clbnnc.com) 
GREGORY R. RAUCH 
(grauch@magyarlawfirm.com) 
F:16936\Plendings\080 Deel Atty Fees.wpd 
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THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: :.:;Is:!_./ ___________ _ 
T. Jason Wood 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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T. Jason Wood, Esq., ISB ff. 5016 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Telephone: (208) 522-1230 
Gregory R. Rauch, ISB# 7389 
THE LAW OFFICES OF MAGYAR & RAUCH. PLLc 
POBox8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Tel: (208) 882-1906 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTR1CT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
KEVIN E. MAYS, 
Plaintiff, 
V, 











Case No. CV08-552-C-EJL-CWD 
DECLARATION OF 
LEANDER L. JAMES, VI 
I, Leander L. James, IV, declare under penalty of perjury, as follows: 
PAGE. 42 
l. I am a shareholder in and a founding member of the firm of James, Vernon & Weeks, 
P.A., in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. I have been actively practicing law since 1993. I am fifty-one years 
old. I was admitted to the Idaho State Bar on September 23, 1993. I was admitted to the 
Washington Bar on November 10, 1994. I am also admitted to practice before the United States 
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District Courts for the District of Idaho, Eastern and Western Districts of Washington, and the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin. I am rated BV with Martindale-Hubbell. I am a Past-President of the 
Idaho Trial Lawyers Association (ITLA), and I am currently an Amicus Committee Chair for that 
organization. I am an appomted board member of the Idaho State Bar Professional Conduct Board. 
Thus, I often interact with other members of the Bar on issues of legal professionalism. 
2. I specializ.e in complex civil litigation and trial work, mcluding catastrophic injury 
cases, employment law, civil rights litigation like the instant case, multi-district litigation, and 
commercial litigation, both for plaintiffs and defendants, but a majority on behalf of plaintiffs. 
About 75% ofmy cases have been for contingent fees approximately25% have been hourly. I have 
been involved in many sophisticated litigation and trial battles and have tried numerous cases to 
verdict. Most of my trials have lasted at least 5 days. 
3. I have presented at seminars on behalf the Idaho Bar Association, Kootenai County Bar 
Association, the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association and the Western Trial Lawyers Association on subjects 
of civil litigation and trial advocacy. I have published, at the request of editors, in the Idaho State Bar 
joumal Advocate and the Idaho Trial. Lmryers Association Journal on issues of civil litigation and 
insurance law. I have testified, at the request of legislators and public interest groups, before the Idaho 
State Legislatmeregarding issues of civil litigation and insurance. I have presented two cases before the 
Idaho Supreme Court and one case before the Idaho Court of Appeals, including the cases of Johnson v. 
Sanchez, 140 Idaho 667 (Ct App. 2005) and Akers v. D.L White et. al, Docket Nos. 30795 and 30845. 
4. The majority of the civil litigator's work is done out of court. e.g. through investigation. 
written discovery, depositions, legalresem:cb, briefing, motion practice, mediations and arbitrations. But 
when the case goes to trial, the work increa.5e5 exponentially. In the past five years I have litigated over 
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ninety-five civil cases, many involving complex litigation and personal injmy. I have litigated most of 
these cases through written discovery and depositions. In this time frame I have litigated approximately 
twenty civil cases through discoveiy and trial preparation (i.e. the case settled shortly before or during 
trial). IhavetriedatleastsixteencivilcasestojuryverdictsasthePlaintiff'sattomey,includinginsurance 
and complex--civil cases, such as medical malpractice cases. At least five of my trials have lasted more 
than seven working days. Four of these trials laste.d fourteen working days or more. One of these cases 
was a two-week, complex, civil litigation actionm Anoka County, Minnesota. Also, I have mediated and 
arbitrated a nmnber of personal injury cases as both the Plaintiff's attorney and as the mediator and 
arbitrator. 
5. My hourly fee schedule for plaimiff's litigation and 1rial work ranges from a minimum 
of$200/hr. to a maximum of $325/br. The complexities and nature of the litigation drive the decision-
making on the appropriate hourly rate. My partners, Craig Vernon and Susan Weeks, charge similar 
amounts as their ordinary hourly rates in such representation. 
6. I am personally f.amiliar with the billing pmctices of a number of law finns and lawyers 
throughout the States ofldaho and Washington, particularly northern. Idaho and P.astem Washington, 
including Coeur d'Alene, Idaho and Spokane, Washington. I have developed this knowledge in a 
number of ways including my. previous work litigating with other attorneys and finns, informal 
conversations with professional colleagues, presentations during professional development conferences, 
and on a number of occasions, having other attorneys prepare affidavitB regarding their fee practices. 
7. There are a large number of factors that impact an attorney's hourly rate. The factors 
include, but are not limited to, the unique knowledge that the attorney can put to WOik for the client, the 
relationship with the particular client, the risks p~ted by the particular litigation, the complexity of 
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the case and length of the case, the nature of the opposing party, the stream of business a client can 
provide, the desirability of the case and likelihood of getting paid over how long a period of time. 
8. For example, my experience has taught me that large corporate institutions and insurance 
companies get a "good deal" (i.e. a better price) and can retain lawyers who could otherwise command 
a much higher fee because they offer a regular stream of business for the lawyer. Such institutions also 
provide work that the more experienced attorney can have perfonned by younger, less experienced 
lawyers. Often the "originating attorney'' in such situations gives this work to the least experienced 
lawyer, financially bene:fitting the "originating attorney," thus effectively increasing his or her net hourly 
income. My furn does not compensate for such "origination." 
9. I amfamiliarwith Jason Wood through the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association (ITI.A), and 
by professional reputation. He served on the Regional Board of Directors Regional Board of Directors 
for the ITIA Idaho Trial Lawyers Association from 2005-2010, while I was on the Board of Directors, 
Executive Committee, and as its president His reputation in the legal community is as one of the most 
knowledgeable and capable attorneys in Idaho regarding Civil Rights litigation. I have reviewed his 
declaration and the declaration of his co-counsel, Mr. Oregoiy Rauch, filed in support of their motion for 
attorney fees in the above matter. 
. . 
1 O. Based onniy personal~owledge of the experience, expertise, and abilities of Mr. Wood 
and of prevailing and customary hourly fee rates in the Coeur d'Alene area for attorneys sharing similar 
experience, reputation, and expertise, in complex and difficult cases of this kind, it is my opinion that an 
hourly rate of$300.00 per hour at the present time is warranted under the circumstances and well within 
the range of customary rates of attorneys in this area. I am familiar with a number of attorneys who 
would charge a higher hourly fee for complex and difficult plaintiff's civil litigation. This is particularly 
4 - DECLARAUON OF LEANDBR. L. JAMES, IV 
00158 
Jun.28.2016 22:40 Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter 4067217364 PAGE. 46 
,,0'"+,, 
Case 3:08-cv-005~ .::JL -C\' ·· Document 221 Filed 07/1. .. , 1 Page 5 of 8 
true in litigating against governmental entities and employees, given their ability to "throw" essentiaJly 
unlimited resources at the litigation. I charge $250..325/hr for such cases. 
11. My professional opinion based on my experience, background and education is that 
$300.00 per hour in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, would be a reasonable rate if an attorney were to get paid 
regularly as the case proceeded to resolution. Many attomeys who regularly work on a contingency fee 
basis would not even begin the work on a case of this complexity against governmental defendants unless 
they bad a realistic expectation that they had a substantial possibility they would ultimately recover four 
to five times the $300.00 hourly rate. I do know that there are a number of lawyers in Idaho, particularly 
counsel with comparable years of practice as Mr. Wood now charging $300.00 to $400.00 an hour for 
complex civil litigation 
12. I can state without hesitation that most attomeys in private practice would refuse to 
undertake this case in the first place because of the difficulties inherent in such civil rights litigation and 
attorneys' m:rfamiliarity with the legal issues and substantive facts. It would widoubtedly be a time and 
money sink. and even if the plaintiff were fortUnate enough to prevail it would be several years before 
costs would be reimbursed and any compensation would be received for the attorney's efforts. 
Consequently. citizens in need oflegal representation on civil rights issues often can't find an attorney 
willing to represent them, because the risks of not being adequately compensated are just too great 
Having reviewed this case. and in light of the several problems it entails, such as multiple defendant 
issues, pre-existing condition issues, multiplo-incident issues, and difficult damage issues, in addition to 
the usual difficulties suing police officers and governmental entities. the risks were so great that in my 
opinion it would be highly unlikely that ANY attorney in this area would have taken this case. 
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13. Significantly, the inability of the plaintiff to pay any fees, the unique risks associated with 
ever obtaining a fee awaro in this type of case, the long delays in receiving compensation, and the 
inability of the plaintiffs to pay for costs, all make a substantial hourly fee appropriate. Tue difficulty, 
even unlikelihood, of PJaintiffi; obtaining counsel with the financial ability and long-tenn commitment 
to make sure a case like this is properly pursued, cannot be overstated. This is especially true for small 
firms like Mr. Wood's and Mr. Rauch,s, because the attorney has to set aside other clients and cases to 
devote time to this type of litigation. It not only affects his current practice but also his ability to truce on 
other representation. especially clients who pay their bill on a monthly basis and provide necessary cash 
flow. 
14. The vast majority of my practice is done on a contingency fee basis. Such a practice 
contains large :financial risks. I frequently evaluate new cases from the perspective of whether to accept 
it on a contingency fee basis. My evaluation of a case like this one would be that the potential success 
is far off and the risks of failure would be vecy high. An attorney in Coeur d'Alene who agreed to talce 
a case on a contingency fee basis would normally recover a fee based upon thirty-three (33), forty ( 40) 
percent, or forty-five (45) of the total recovery or more and theclientwouldhaveto pay all of the costs. 
I believe that a contingency fee lawyer in this area would charge a higher rate for this case and most, if 
not all. would simply refuse to accept a c.ase like this. On a contingency fee basis. 500/o would be my rate 
for a case like tbi~ if! took the case at all. But I turn down cases like these on a regular basis because 
of the financial risk 
15. For all these reasons, I am of the finn opinion that $300.00 per hour is a reasonable rate 
of compensation at this time for Mr. Wood's work on this case. 
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16. I have also reviewed the Declaration of Gregory R Ra~ co-counsel for Plaintiff in this 
matter, and I concurtbat $250 per houris reasonable and in accordance with prevailing rates of attorneys 
with similar experience, expertise, and abilifr. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and COIIeCt under the laws of the 
United S1ates to the best of my knowledge and belie£ 
DATED this 14th dayofJuly, 2011. 
7 - DECLARATION OF LEANDERL.1AMES, N 
00161 
Jun.28.2016 22:43 Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter 4067217364 PAGE. 49 
Case 3:08-cv-005t.. .::JL -C\ Document 221 Filed 07/1-.. , 1 Page 8 of 8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTWY that on July 14, 2011, I filed the foregoing electronically through the 
CM/ECF system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as more 
fully :reflected on the Notice of Electronic Filing: 
BRIAN K.. JULIAN 
(Qiu1ian@ajhlaw.com) 
CHRIS H. HANSEN 
(chhansen@ajhiaw.com) 
SONYALEE R NUTSCH 
(snutsch@clbnnc.com) 
GREGORY R RAUCH 
(grauch@magyarlawfinn.com) 
DECLARA.llON OF LEANDER L JAMES, TV 
TIIOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES. PLLC 
T. Jason Wood 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
00162 
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Howard A. Belodoff 
BELODOFP LAW OFFICE 
1004 West Fort St 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Tel (208) 331-3378 
Fax (208) 947...0014 
1SB#2290 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
JEFF D., et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
CLEMENT LEROY OTTER, et al., 
Defendants/ Appellees. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 












Court of Appeals 
Docket No. 07-36009 
District Court Docket No. 
CV-80-4091 
AFFIDAVIT OF KURT HOLZER 
IN SUPPORT OF AW ARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES 
KURT HOLZER. being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
PAGE. 50 
1. That I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state ofldaho. I was a admitted 
to the St.ate Bar in 1992 and have practiced continuously in the state of Idaho since 1993, after the 
conclusion of an Appellate Court Clerkship in Utah. I have extensive civil litigation experience in 
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both federal and state comt litigation. I am admitted before all state courts in the state of Idaho and 
the U.S. District ofldaho. I have appeared many times before Idaho Supreme Court. 
2. Starting in 1993 ,I practiced.for seven (7) years with the Boise office of the law firm 
of Holland & Hart, LLP, a then 220 plus lawyer multi-state law firm based in Denver. I specialized 
in complex commercial and contingent-fee personal injury litigation. I have been involved in many 
sophisticated litigation battles and have tried numerous cases to verdict I have handled a number of 
appeals as well as cases of originaljmisdiction in appellate courts. In October of 2000, my partners 
and I founded a multi-state firm under the name of Murphy, Holzer, & V augban, LLC. In January 
2005, we disbanded that fmn and I became a shareholder in what is now Holzer Edwards, Chtd. 
This finn has been in existence for almost twenty years. 
3. I have been an active member of the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association Board of 
Directors since 1997. I served that organization as its President during 2005-06. I am currently 
serving my third tenn as a member of the Professional Conduct Board of the Idaho State Bar. For a 
number of years, I annually presented Idaho Supreme Court reviews to the membership of the 4th 
District Bar Association. I am also member of the Litigation Section of the Idaho State Bar. Thus, I 
often interact with other members of the Bar in both case advocacy and professional development 
settings. 
4. My practice focuses primarily on contingent personal injwy litigation. I continue to 
maintain a small portion of my practice in business and consumer litigation. My ordinary hourly-rate 
ranges between $250 and $300 per hour for such litigation or for injury litigation where an hourly 
rate is used. When I am working on an hourly basis, I also require that a client pay a retainer to 
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insure payment of the fee. The complexities and nature of the litigation drive the decision making on 
the appropriate hourly rate. My partner, John Edwards, charges similar amounts as his ordinary 
hourly rate in such representation. 
5. At the request of Plaintiffs' counsel, I have refamiliarized myself with the history of 
this case. I have for many years--well over a decade and closer to two--had knowledge of this 
litigation based on media reports and infonnal conversations with other attorneys. In 2002 and then 
again in early 2007, I undertook an in-depth review of the proceedings by reviewing the docket and 
filings in depth through that time. 
6. In preparing this particular Affidavit~ I have reviewed the Opening and Reply Briefs 
filed in this appeal. One of the notable things that jumps out from that briefing, particularly in the 
Reply Brief, is the repeated citation to and quotation from the voluminous record in the case. I 
certainly understand from experience that the effort required to create such a. detailed and precise 
review .of a big record involves a huge time investment to ensure its accuracy and usefulness for the 
reviewing court 
7. I am personally fiuniliar with the billing practices of a number of Boise, Idaho law 
firms and lawyers. J have developed this knowledge in a number of ways including working within a 
large firm., informal conversations with professional colleagues, presentations during professional 
development conferences, and on a number of occasions, having other attorneys prepare affidavits 
regarding their fee practices. 
8. There are a large number of factors that impact an attorney's hourly rate. The 
factors include, but are not limited to, the unique knowledge that the attorney can put to work for the 
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client, the relationship with the particular client, the risks presented by the particular litigation, the 
nature of the opposing party, and the stream of business a client can provide. 
9. For example, my experience has taught me that large corporate institutions and 
insurance companies get a "good deal" (i.e. a better price) and can retain lawyers who cou[d 
otherwise command a higher fee because they offer a regular stream of business for the lawyer. Such 
institutions also provide work tbat the more experienced attorney can have performed by younger, 
less experienced lawyers. 
10. I am familiar with Howard Belodoff primarily by professional reputation. His 
reputation in the legal community is as one of the (if not the) most knowledgeable attorneys in Idaho 
regarding Civil Rights litigation. Based on my personal knowledge and review of the materials cited 
above and given Mr. Belodoff's extensive experience and his role as lead counsel for over thirty one 
(31) years, it is my opinion that an hourly rate of$400.00 per hour at the present time is warranted 
under the circwnstances. It is at a minim'tlll1 similar to, and in aomc cases less than, what other 
attorneys of comparable experience level in Boise would charge for the work at issue. 
11. I am familiar with a number of attorneys who would charge a higher hourly foe for 
complex and difficult civil class action litigation and appeals. That is particularly true where such 
litigation and appeals involves thousands of class members and state officials are the defendants. 
Structural bureaucratic issues as well as the frictions created by interaction with the political 
processes and the ability to ·'throw' essentially unlimited resources at the litigation. often make 
governmental defendants particularly difficult and at times even unpleasant to litigate against. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KURT HOLZER IN SUPPORT OF A WARD OF A'ITORNEY FEES -Page 4 
OOlb· 
Jun.28.2016 22:47 F~rrison/Trigg/Carpenter 4067217364 PAGE. 54 
12. My professional opinion based on my experience, background and education is that 
$400.00 an hour would be a reasonable rate if an attorney were to get paid regularly as the case 
proceeded to resolution. Many attorneys who regularly work on a contingency fee basis would not 
even begin the work on a case of this sophistication and magnitude unless they bad a realistic 
expectation that they had a substantial possibility they would ultimately recover three to four times 
the $400.00 an hour rate. I do know that there are a number of lawyers in Idaho, particularly senior 
counsel with comparable years of practice as Mr. Belodoff, now charging $350.00 to $450.00 an 
hour for complex litigation and appellate work. 
13. Understanding and presenting issues involving the rights of thousands of mentally 
ill children, undertaking the efforts to monitor and enforce compliance with the Consent Decrees and 
Court Orders in this case all involve complex and sophisticated issues that would befuddle most 
attorneys unfamiliar with the substantive law or the state programs that provide children's mental 
health services. To successfully battle with often recalcitrant state agencies requires experienced, 
tenacious, diligent and knowledgeable counsel such as Mr. Belodoff'who bas worked on the case and 
with the clients over several decades. No attorney could replicate the depth of knowledge and 
experience that he has acquired over that length of time. This also separates Mr. Belodoff from 
attorneys who specialize in other areas of the Jaw but have no understanding or knowledge of the 
complexities of this case or the factual issues presented by the plaintiff class. The depth and breadth 
of knowledge Mr. Belodoff bas developed is in a sense irreplaceable. 
14. r sat as a member of the legal. panel of the ACLU ofldaho for a number of years. 
Among the items reviewed in that panel's deliberations are civil rights issues of many sorts. In that 
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role, I learned of the attorneys in our community who have an understanding of, and a practice with 
some focus on, civil rights litigation. I believe it is fair to say that there is not another lawyer in the 
Boise legal community who bas the expertise or experience Mr. Belodoff has in this type of civil 
rights litigation. 
15. I can state without hesitation that most attomeys in private practice would refuse to 
undertake this case in the first place because of the complexity of the litigation and attorney's 
unfamiliarity with the legal issues and substantive facts. Any rational attorney reviewing the case 
would hesitate to tmdertake or continue with this appeal after the district court's dismissal after it 
found the defendants had substantially complied with the consent decrees and court implementation 
plan. It would undoubtedly appear to be a time and money sink. With my understanding of the case 
and after reviewing plaintiff's briefing on appeal it is very apparent that the issues in this appeal were 
unique, complex and postured in a manner that would make the likelihood of success seem remote. 
My opinion is the limited chance of success on appeal would deter any attorney except one with the 
specialized knowledge of Mr. Belodoff and with 'the devotion to his clients and the cause 
demonstrated over his years of commibnent to the representation. 
16. Very significantly, the inability of the plaintiffs to pay any fees, the unique risks 
associated with ever obtaining a fee award in this type of case, the long delays in receiving 
compensation, and the inability of the plaintiffs to pay for costs all make a substantial hourly fee 
appropriate. The difficulty, even unlikelihoody of Plaintiffs obtaining counsel with the long-tenn 
commitment to make sure a case like this is properly pursued, cannot be overstaled. This is 
especially true for a solo practitioner, such as Mr. Belodoff, or for a small two or three person law 
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finn because the attorney has to set aside all other clients and cases to devote his full 1imeto this type 
of litigation. It not only affects his current practice but also his ability to take on other 
representation 
17. The type of advocacy pursued in this case honors the best traditions of our justice 
system. The repeated successes on behalf of the clients bespeaks of the quaJity of the work 
performed. 
18. The vast majority of my practice is done on a contingency fee basis. Such a practice 
contains large financial risks. I frequently evaluate new cases from the perspective of whether to 
accept it on a contingency fee basis. My evaluation of a case like this one would be that the potential 
success is far off and the risks of failure would be very high. An attorney in Boise who agreed to 
take a case on a contingency fee basis would nonnally recover a fee based upon thirty-three (33) or 
forty (40) percent of the total recovery or more and the client would have to pay all of the costs. I 
believe that a contingency fee lawyer in this area would charge a higher rate for this case and most, if 
not aJI, would simply refuse to accept a case like this. 
19. The dedication of Plaintiffs' counsel after more than 31 years and the benefits 
received by thousands of mentally ill Idaho children and their families, the continuing failure of the 
Defendants' to abide by the Court's Orders, the contingent nature of the attorney's fees award, the 
rates charged by other experienced counsel in this locale, certainly more than suffices for me to be of 
the opinion that $400.00 per hour is.a reasonable rate of compensation at this time for Mr. Belodoff s 
work in the appeal of th.is case. 
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2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this lo! :.Y day of June, 2011. I electronically filed the 
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which sent a Notice of 
Electronic Filing or I mailed, first class postage paid, a copy of the docwnent to the following 
person: 
James D. Carlson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Statehouse, Room210 
Boise, ID 8372()..001 0 
Charles Johnson 
Johnson Olson, Chtd 
P.O. Box 1725 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Michael S. Gilmore 
Deputy Attorney General 
Statehome. Room 210 
· Boise ID 83720-0010 
Nancy Bishop 
Deputy Attomey General 
Department of Juvenile Corrections 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-5100 
/s/ Howard Belodoff 
PAGE. 57 
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PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
Idaho State Bar No. 1329 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
The Train Station 
13th and Main Streets 
P. 0. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 

















Case No. CV ** 
DEFENDANTS, MEMORANDUM 
OF COSTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF 
ATTORNEY FEES 
PAGE. 58 
COMES NOW the Defendants in the above-entitled action and make this Memorandum of 
Costs and Affidavit of Attorney Fees expended in the above entitled action as follows: 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The Defendants are entitled to attorney fees because of the Court's ruling in the 
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Sanctions and to Strike Pleadings 
entered by the Court on December 4, 2012. 
Defendants' request attorney fees pursuant to I.R.CP. 37(b)(2) and 37(e). The Defendants 
have established the Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court order on discovery, and the Court is 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEYFEES-1-
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required to grant an award ofreasonable attorney's fees and costs to the Defendants for the money 
spent pursing this motion. 
As stated above, virtually all of the work related to the Defendants• Motion for Sanctions and 
to Strike Plaintiff's Pleadings in the above-captioned matter, related to the claims of the Plaintiffs 
which were dismissed. The total sum of $660.00 is reasonable for Defendants' attorney fees based 
on the work and expertise that was involved in this case. Exhibit A attached hereto, and made a part 
hereof by reference, shows most of the Defendants' attorneys' services rendered on or near the dates 
shown; that all services shown on said Exhibit A were reasonable and necessary; that Defendants' 
attorneys and paralegals have expended at least 2.4 hours based upon the time shown on said Exhibit 
A; the following attorneys/paralegals have worked on the case as indicated by timekeeper code on 
the attached Detailed Fee Transaction File List marked Exhibit A: 
Name of Person 
Timekeeper Performing Work 





The hourly rates charged for legal services above mentioned are reasonable and were necessary for 
the defense of this case. The Defendants were billed at said hourly rates on a monthly basis as work 
was performed. 
The undersigned is an attorney who has been licensed to practice and has practiced in Idaho 
since 1970. The undersigned is familiar with the normal charges for work done in cases of this 
nature. It is the opinion of the undersigned that the sum of$660.00 is a reasonable to be awarded 
to be awarded in this matter. 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
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DATED this __ day ofDeoernber, 2012. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
CLARK and FEENEY 
By~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Paul Thomas Clark, a member of the firm. 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
PAUL THOMAS CLARK, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
PAGE. 60 
That he is the attorney for the Defendants herein; that he has read the foregoing instrument, 
knows the contents thereof and the facts stated therein are to the best of his knowledge, information 
and belief, and that the costs claimed are in conformance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day December, 2012. ---
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY FEES .3. 
Notary Public in and for the State ofldaho 
Residing at Lewiston therein. 
My Commission expires: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of December, 2012, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Greg Monzo 
PO Box 5411 
Beaverton, OR 97006 
Greg Monzo 
POBox522 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
AFFIDA VJT OF A Tl'ORNEY FEES -4-
D U.S. Mail 
0 Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
0 Telecopy 
0 U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
0 Telecopy 
By.~-~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~ 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Charles H. Carpenter 
Idaho Bar No. 8322 
Carpenter Law Firm plc 
210 N. Higgins Avenue Suite 336 
Missoula, Montana 59802 
(406) 543-0511 
carpentc@carpenterlawfirmplc.com 
Attornry for Plaintiff 









IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
FISH AND GAME, and 











) ___________ ) 
No. CV 12-146 
1,ffiMORANDUM IN 0PP0Sffi0N 
TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
The Motion to Reconsider filed by the Idaho Department of Fish and Grune 
("Fish & Game") adds neither relevant facts nor legal argument omitted from the 
Summary Judgment argument heard by the Court in May 2016. The facts underlying 
the Rule 16(i) sanction imposed are not in dispute, nor does Fish & Game contest 
them meaningfully. There is and can be no dispute that Fish & Game failed to assert 
its statutory employer immunity defense prior to March 2016. The rules of civil 
001'15 
Jun.28.2016 22:56 Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter 4067217364 PAGE. 66 
procedure are clear that this should have been done years earlier although this Court, 
following the Supreme Court in Fuhriman v. Department ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800 
(2007), has been, in Krinitt's view, overly generous in allowing the assertion of the 
defense at all, and there is a~d can be no dispute that Fish & Grune failed to follow 
the rules or the scheduling order in bringing its Motion for Summary Judgment so 
late. There is, further, no dispute that the Court has the authority, in its discretion, to 
award sanctions under Rule 16(i). Fish & Game's Motion to Reconsider, then is mere 
disagreement with the Court's imposition of a sanction. 
It offers no reasons for this disagreement not already presented to the Court. 
It claims that the failure to timely assert the defense was an oversight of counsel- this 
was thoroughly discussed at the hearing, and is well reflected in the Court's opinion. 
It does not, and cannot, argue that the Court was unaware that it was exercising 
discretion, that it exceeded the bounds of its discretion, or that the Court did not 
reach its decision to impose a sanction through an exercise of reason. Sec Westry v. 
Schaefer, 17 Idaho 116,621 (2014). Finally, Fish & Game does not address the very 
real harm its "oversight" caused Krinitt. It thus misses the Court's point completely. 
Instead of offering new facts relevant to the sanction, or new legal argument, 
Fish & Game seems more interested in offering its account about why the mediation 
failed. Krinitt finds this inappropriate, unseemly, and disagrees completely with Fish 
& Game's suggestion that he is at fault for the failure of the mediation. An Affidavit 
from Krinitt's counsel is attached hereto; it concerns only the mediation, and if the 
2 
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Court agrees that consideration of the discussions at the mediation is improper at this 
point, Krinitt asks that the Court disregard his counsel's Affidavit and that of Mt. 
Johnson. 
In sum, Fish & Game has given the Court no good reason to vacate its 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on the 29th day of June, 2016, I served the foregoing by mailing, 
by fax and by email to: 
Peter J. Johnson 
JOHNSON LAW GROUP 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
4 
OUl"'S) . I'"' 
Jul.10.2016 19:46 Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter 406721 r · 'l PAGE. 2/ 4 
Charles H. Carpenter 
Idaho Bar No. 8322 
Carpenter Law Firtn pk 
210 N. Higgins Avenue Suite 336 
Missoula, Montana 59802 
(406) 543-0511 
caq:,cntc@car.pentetlawfirmpk.com 
AttomfJ for Plaintiff 
Lewis County District Court 
. J / kflLED j 
AT j-r--4-0'CLOCKf!M 
JUL 11 2015 





IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
FIS.I-I AND GAME, and 
STATE OF IDAB01 
Defendant~. 




) AGREED UPON CALCULATIONS 




) ____________ ) 
As disc1.tssed at the hearing Friday, counsel have consulted and worked thmugh 
the calculations together, They agree as follows M• the maximum cost/ fee amouht 
under the Court's June 1, 2016 Order is $71)981.83. The agreed upon floor for costs 
and fees, if any arc awarded, is $58,279.83. 
The balance, $13,702.00, is in dispute, and is comprised of three categories: 
$9,402 for Carpenter's attorney's fees in connection with the 2016 Summary 
00178 
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Judgment Motion; $3,400.00 for Sullivan's attorney's fees in connection with the 
mediation; and $900.00 for McPherson's travd expenses in connection with the 
expert depositions in Denver. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on the 11 111 day of July, 2016, I served the foregoing by fax to; 
Peter J. Johnson 
JOHNSON LAW GROUP 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207 .. 2317 
3 
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Lewis County District 
1 " FILED 
Ar:tzlo·cwcKf-M 
JUL 2 1 "'" .... , i tt{!t 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS 






STATE OF IDAHO ) 
DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND ) 
GAME, et. al. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) __________ ) 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
CASE NO. CV12-146 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff Perry Krinitt is awarded attorney fees and costs in the amount of 
$68,581.83. . ~ 
DATED this Q / day of July, 2016. 
Judgment ... 1 
0018? 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. I, t
1
he ~~igned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that 
on this ~ay of July, 2016, served a true and correct copy of the Judgment by 
mail or fax to: 
Peter J. Johnson 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane,\NA 99207-2317 
Charles H. Carpenter 
210 N. Higgins Ave. Suite 336 







Lewis County Disrrict Court 
F~<; l!"."'D 
_!_/,; • ~ LC ..,o_ 
Al-1=£.L_O'CLOCK//_.M 
JUL 2 1 2016 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS 






STATE OF IDAHO . ) 
DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND ) 
GAME, et. al. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ___________ ) 
CASE NO. CV12-146 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
Defendant Idaho Department of Fish and Game, (IDFG) has timely asked the 
· Court to reconsider the portion of its order dated June 1, 2016 which granted Plaintiff 
Perry Krinitt {Krinitt) expenses and attorney fees incurred since January 31, 2014. The 
Court imposed the fees as a sanction under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(i) because 
IDFG filed their dispositive motion after the scheduling orde~ cut-off date of January 31, 
2014. 
The decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider is committed to the 
discretion of the Court. Dawson v. Cheyovich FamUy Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 380, 234 
P.3d 699, 704 (2010). 
lt is also within the Court's discretion to impose sanctions for not complying with 
a pre-trial scheduling order. Lepperv. E. Idaho Health Servs., Inc., 160 Idaho 104, 369 
P.3d 882, 887 (2016), reh'g denied (Apr. 15, 2016). In fashioning sanctions, a trial 
court should 'balance the equities by comparing the culpability of the disobedient party 
Order denying motion to reconsider-I 
0018'1 
with the resulting prejudice to the innocent party.' Peterson v. Mccawley 135 Idaho 
282,284, 16 P.3d 958,960 (Ct. App. 2000), citation omitted. 
In its Order, dated June 1, 2016, the Court stated that the Department's delay in 
filing its dispositive motion was not substantially justified and that there are no 
circumstances which would make the awarding of fees and expenses to Krinitt unjust. 
Krinitt was ah innocent party that incurred a great amount of litigation expense and time 
needlessly pursuing a negligence claim. Prejudice to the wronged party is considered 
to be an aggravating factor when awarding sanctions. Fish Haven Resort, Inc. v. 
,Amold, 121 Idaho 118, 122, 822 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Ct. App. 1991). 
In imposing the attorney fee sanction, this Court made the punishment fit the 
crime and was not a sanction that prevented the adjudication of the merits of the matter. 
Id;, citing S. Idaho Prod. CreditAss'n v. Astorquia, concurring opinion, 113 Idaho 526, 
529,746 P.2d 985, 988 {1987). 
Courts 11 ••• cannot function efficiently unless they can effectively require 
compliance with reasonable rules. Absence of meaningful power to require that 
compliance would make for disorder and preclude effective judicial administration at the 
trial court level.' ,, Id., citing Devault v. Steven L. Herndon, A Prof/ Ass'n, 107 Idaho 1, 
3,684 P.2d 978, 980 (1984}, quoting Chism v. National Heritage Ute Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 
1328, 1332 (9th Cir.1981). 
Based upon the above, defendant's motion for reconsideration of its order dated 
June 1, 2016 which granted Plaintiff expenses and attorney fees incurred since January __.... 
31, 2014 is denied. qjJ 
DATED this J / day of July, 2016. 
District Judge 
Order denying :motion to reconsider-2 
0018~) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, th~ yr.rsigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that 
on thi&&l--day of Ju~ 2016, served a true and correct copy of the Order Denying 
Motion to Reconsider by wfuil or fax to: 
Peter J. Johnson 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane,VVA 99207-2317 
Charles H. Carpenter 
210 N. Higgins Ave. Suite 336 
Missoula, Montana 59802 





Lewis County District Cou,t 
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1
F I LED 
AT~O'CLOCK/j2.M 
JUL 2 1 2016 
By. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS 






STATE OF IDAHO ) 
DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND ) 
GAME, et. al. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) _______ ) 
CASE NO. CV12-146 
ATTORNEY FEES ORDER 
Plaintiff Krinitt has submitted a Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
in response to the Court's order, dated June 1, 2016. Defendant Department of Fish 
and Game filed a Motion to Disallow a Portion of Plaintiff's Costs and Attorney Fees. 
The Court heard argument on the Motion at a telephonic hearing held July 8, 2016. At 
that hearing the parties agreed to consult and agree on a floor for costs and fees and 
the maximum amount to be awarded. 
Remaining in dispute, as outlined in the document filed July 11, 2016 are $9,402 
for Plaintiff's attorney fees in connection with the 2016 summary judgment motion, 
$3,400 for a California consulting attorney, and $900 for a consulting expert to travel to 
depositions. The parties agreed that the maximum amount that the Court could award 
was $71,981.83. A minimum of $58,279.83 was also set. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allow the Court to impose attorney fee sanctions 
for violations of pre-trial orders. Nepanuseno v. Hansen, 140 Idaho 942,947, 104 P.3d 
984, 989 (Ct. App. 2004). The choice of sanction is committed to the discretion of the 
Attorney fee order-1 
00187 
Court. Aho v. Idaho Transp. Dep't of State, 145 idaho 192, 194, 177 P.3d 406, 408 (Ct. 
App. 2·008). 
The Court finds that the per hour fee of attorney Charles H. Carpenter is 
reasonable and that in considering the reason for the sanctiont fees incurred in the 
amount of $9,402 for the 2016 summary judgment motion are awarded. Consulting 
expert travel costs to depositions were also a reasonable and necessary and are 
awarded. The Court further finds that fees for a consulting attorney in California were 
not necessary. Carpenter's attendance at the mediation in California was sufficient, 
Fees for the California attorney are not awarded. 
THEREFORE, attorney fees in the amount of $68,581.83 are awarded to Plaintiff 
Perry Krinitt. pk: 
DATED this t:J f day of July, 2016. 
Attorney fee order-2 
00188 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
di !,W~igned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that 
on this > day of July, 2016, served a true and correct copy of the Attorney Fee 
Order by mail or fax to: 
Peter J. Johnson 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Charles H. Carpenter 
21 O N. Higgins Ave. Suite 336 
Missoula, Montana 59802 




PETER J. JOHNSON, ISB # 4105 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Phone: (509) 835-5000 
Fax: (509) 326-7503 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Lewis County District Court 
F~LED 
A ;/.:[:[i(O' CLOC#y(_ M 
AUG 2 9 2016 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND 
GAME and STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
NO. CV 12-146 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: CHARLES H. CARPENTER, CARPENTERLAWFIRM,210N. HIGGINS AVENUE, SUITE 
336, MISSOULA, MT. 59802, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants, Idaho Department of Fish and Game, and State of Idaho, 
appeal against the above-named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Attorney fees 
Order and Judgment in favor of respondent entered in the above-entitled action on July 21, 2016, by 
001~.10 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - l 
JOHNSON LAW GROUP 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
TEL: (509) 835-5000 FAX: (509) 326-7'\01 
the Honorable Judge Fitzmaurice presiding. A copy of the Judgment and Attorney Fees Order is 
attached to this notice. 
2. Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court as the judgment described 
in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(l) I.A.R. 
3. Appellants intend to raise the following issue on appeal: 
(a) Whether the district court properly awarded respondent attorney fees and costs 
notwithstanding the fact that appellants were the prevailing party when the district 
court dismissed respondent's lawsuit with prejudice. 
4. No transcript is being requested. 
5. The appellants request the following documents be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. and those already 
submitted with the Clerk's Record on appeal in connection with appeal filed by the 
plaintiff-respondent in this appeal on July 11, 2016. 
(a) Defendants Memorandum Of Authorities In Support Of Reconsideration Of A 
Portion Of The Summary Judgment Memorandum Order And Judgment; 
(b) Verified Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees; 
(c) Defendants Motion To Disallow A Portion Of Plaintiff's Costs And Attorney Fees; 
(d) Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Disallow Certain Of Plaintiff's 
Submitted Costs And Attorney Fees; 
(e) Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Disallow Certain Costs; 
(f) Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Reconsider; 
(g) Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Disallow Certain Costs; 
(h) Agreed Upon Calculation With Respect To Fees And Costs; 
(i) Judgment; 
(j) Order Denying Motion To Reconsider; 
(k) Attorney Fees Order. 
6. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
0019t 
JOHNSON LAW GROUP 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 TEL: (50()) R1'i-'iOOO PAY· ,,nm.,-,;: ..,~M 
7. I certify: 
(a) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
(b) That no filing fee is required by the State of Idaho or it agency pursuant to state law. 
(c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. See Certificate of Service appended hereto. 
DATED: August 26, 2016. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
Respectfully submitted 
B ~~~'----r-+--,"'-+-~-' _/?_.~-~-· -- -·--_,_' 
PETERJ.J 0 
00192 
JOHNSON LAW GROUP 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207 
Telephone: (509) 835-5000 
Facsimile: (509) 326-7503 
pjohnson@johnsonl aw .org 
Attorney for Defendants 
JOHNSON LAW GROUP 
I 03 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
TEL: r.c;ocn R1.c;:_.c;:nnn oA v. ,c:nn, "'""" ~l"'I"\,, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
·11 !J-
I hereby certify that on the~ day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a copy of the 
foregoing by mail to the following: 
Charles H. Carpenter 
Carpenter Law Firm, PLC 
210 N. Higgins A venue, Suite 336 
Missoula, MT 59802 
Phone: (406)543-0511 
Fax: (406) 258-0365 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
700 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
001~3 
JOHNSON LAW GROUP 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
TEL: (509) 835-5000 FAX: (509) 326-7503 
JUL 2 5 REC'J 
-!OHNSON LAW GRQ(Jp 





JUL 2 1 2015 
IN THE DI.STRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE :OF 1DAHO, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWI$ 






STATE-OF IDAHO } 
DEPARTMENT OFFISH.AND ) 




,JUDGMENT JS ENTERED ~S l=OLLOWS; 
CASE NO-. CV12-146 
JUDGME.N'T 
Plaintiff Perry Krinitt is awarded attorney fees:and costs in the amount Of 
'$68,581,63. _ et.-
DATED this Q / ·day of July; 2016., 
)udgment .. 1 
00194 
.. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the UJ).~rsigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that 
on this ~ay of July, 2016, served a true and correct copy of the Judgment by 
mail or fax to: 
Peter J. Johnson 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane,VVA 99207-2317 
Charles H. Carpenter 
210 N. Higgins Ave. Suite 336 
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JOHNSON LAW GROUP 
Lewis County District Court 
t.-i~,FILED 
AT ~01CLOCK_,f2.M 
JUL 2 1 2018 
IN TH~ DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNffY OF LEWIS 






STATE OF IDAHO ) 
DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND ) 
GAME, et. al. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) _______ ) 
CASE NO. CV12-146 
ATTORNEY FEES ORDER 
Plaintiff Krinitt has submitted a Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
in response to the Court's order, dated June 1, 2016. Defendant Department of Fish 
and Game filed a Motion to Disallow a Portion of Plaintiff's Costs and Attorney Fees. 
The Court heard argument on the Motion at a telephonic hearing held July 8, 2016. At 
that hearing the parties agreed to consult and agree on a floor for costs and fees and 
the maximum amount to be awarded. 
Remaining in dispute, as outlined in the document filed July 11, 2016 are $9,402 
for Plaintiff's attorney fees in connection with the 2016 summary judgment motion, 
$3,400 for a California consulting attorney, and $900 for a consulting expert to travel to 
depositions. The parties agreed that the maximum amount that the Court could award 
was $71,981.83. A minimum of $58,279.83 was also set. 
Idaho Rules of CiVil Procedure allow the Court to impose attorney fee sanctions 
for violations of pre-trial orders. Nepanuseno v. Hansen, 140 Idaho 942, 947, 104 P .3d 
984, 989 (Ct. App. 2004). The choice of sanction is committed to the discretion of the 
Attorney fee order-1 
00196 
. \
Court. Aho v. Idaho Trahsp~ Dep't of State, 145 Idaho 192,194, 177 P.3d 406,408 (Cf. 
App. 2'"008). 
The -Col,Jrt finderthat the per hour fee of attorney Charles H, Carpenter is 
reasonabJe and that in considering the reason for the .sanction.,. fee$· incurred in the 
amount of $9,402 fortlie 2Q1.6. summary judgm~nt motion are awarded. Consulting 
-expert travel costs· to depositions wsr~ ~leo a reasonable and necessary and. are 
·awarded. lhe Court further finds th<\t fees for a oonsulting attorney in California were 
not necesS.~ry. Carpenter's attendance .at the mediation .in California· was sufficient, 
Fees for the California attomey are not awarded. 
THEREFORE, attorney fees in the amount of $68.,581 .. 83 are l:iwarded to Plaintiff 
Peny .Kri.nftt. . ~ 
DA1"E:b th.is Q f day. of Ji,lly, ~016. 
Attomeyfee order-2 
001~7 
. -\: ... 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
l,~.!!:,njersigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that 
on thisC{..[.2: d~y of July, 2016, served a true and correct copy of the Attorney Fee 
Order by mail or fax to: 
Peter J. Johnson 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane,VVA 99207-2317 
Charles H. Carpent~r 
210 N. Higgins Ave. Suite 336 
Missoula, Montana 59802 




SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS 




STATE OF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, and ) 
STATE OF IDAHO. ) 
Defendant/ Appellant 
Supreme Court No. 4 L/ ~ ~ 
Case No: CV-2012-0000146 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
Appeal from: SECOND Judicial District, LEWIS County. Honorable GREGORY FITZMAURICE 
presiding. 
Case number from court or agency: CV2012-146 
Order or judgment appealed from: ATTORNEY FEES ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Attorney for Appellant: PETER J JOHNSON 
Attorney for Respondent: CHARLES H CARPENTER 
Appealed by: IDAHO FISH AND GAME and STATE OF IDAHO 
Appealed against: PERRY KRINITT 
Notice of Appeal filed: AUGUST 29, 2016 
Notice of Cross Appeal filed: NA 
Amended Notice of Cross Appeal filed: NA 
Appellate fee paid: $20.00 
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional record filed: NA 
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional reporter's transc~\~~JijJ.fRJ1~;· ••• 
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? NO / ;/" .. ·.; · ••••••• "<: • •• 
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Supreme Court Docket No. 44326-2016 
Lewis County No. CV-2012-146 
Supreme Court Docket No. 44442-2016 
Lewis County No. CV-2012-146 
A NOTICE OF APPEAL was filed in the District Court, on August 29, 2016, from the 
JUDGMENT entered by District Judge Gregory FitzMaurice and filed on July 21, 2016; which was 
then assigned to Supreme Court Docket No. 44442. The Clerk's Record in prior appeal No. 44326, 
Krinitt v. Idaho Dept. of Fish and Game (Lewis CV-2012-146) was augmented to include the 
Record and Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 42417, Krinitt v. Idaho Dept. of Fish and Game 
(Lewis CV-2012-146). Therefore, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Supreme Court Docket Nos. 44326 and 44442 shall be 
CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL PURPOSES under appeal No. 44326 .. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a LIMITED 
CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain documents requested in the Notice of 
Appeal in Docket No. 44442; together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any 
document included in the Clerk's Record filed in appeal Nos. 42417 and 44326. This LIMITED 
CLERK'S RECORD shall be prepared and served on counsel by Friday~ September 16, 2016. 










IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the due date for filing the CLERK'S RECORD AND 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT in these consolidated appeals shall remain set for September 27, 
2016. Upon this Court· s ~ipt of the Record and Transcript, a briefing schedule shall be set. 
DATED this P,_ dayofSeptember, 2016. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
Court Reporter 
District Judge Gregory FitzMaurice 
ORDER - Docket Nos. 44326 I 44442 
el A. Lehrman, · ef Deputy Clerk for _ 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clede 
Entered on JS! 
By: \ty 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




State of Idaho Department of 
Fish and Game and 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
CASE NO. CV-2012-146 
Supreme Court No. 44442-2016 
Certificate of Mailing 
I, the undersigned, a Deputy Clerk of the above entitled 
) 
Court, do hereby certify that a copy of the Limited Clerk's Record 
?±Lt'- ~---9.(J)-was mailed on I :S day of  , 2016 to the following 
persons: 
Charles Carpenter 
210 N Higgins Ave 
Missoula MT 59802 
Peter J Johnson 
103 E Indiana Suite A 
Spokane WA 99207-2317 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING - 1 
00202 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




State of Idaho Department of 
Fish and Game and 
State of Idaho 
DEFENDANTS/APPELLANT 
LEWIS COUNTY NO.CV-12-146 
Supreme Court 
Docket NO. 44442-2016 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT on the ;J_'lf> r . day of 
, 2016, the Clerk's record in the above referenced 
("7"-f'f-....;--
was lodged with the District Court Clerk. 
The parties shall have five (5) days from the date of 
service of the appeal record to file any objections, 
together with a Notice of Hearing, with the District Court. 
If no objection is filed, the record will be deemed settled 
and will be filed with the Supreme Court. 
Cc: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
Alesia Winner, 
n·~:>ni ) u -~ •) 
